

# Notes

## CHAPTER I

1. The notion that the twentieth century has seen the rise and fall of the state as the bearer of a moral project is the main theme of Perez-Diaz (1993).
2. The reader wishing to know more of my general theory could start with the introductory chapters of the two published volumes of my history of power in society (Mann 1986, 1993).
3. Note that Eatwell (2001) renounces the concept of “rebirth,” which he had earlier used, abusing it as “philosophically banal.” I deal with the rival primordial, perennial, and modern conceptions of the nation in my forthcoming book, chap. 2.
4. I write “large” movements because fascist movements often *began* among groups who *were* middle-class (especially students and junior officers). As fascist movements grew larger, they tended to broaden their base. Thus in Northwestern Europe where fascist movements remained small, fascism remained disproportionately middle-class. In France, where it eventually grew quite large, it broadened as it grew.
5. Homosexuality did intermittently accompany such intense male comradeship, though this remains a poorly documented aspect of fascism. It is well known that the Nazi leaders turned strongly against homosexuals in the Roehm purge of 1934. SS personnel records would sometimes note evidence of homosexuality, implying that the organization could use the member’s sense of vulnerability to get him to undertake “hard” (i.e., murderous) tasks.

## CHAPTER 2

1. Gregor anticipates the obvious riposte to this – “what about Germany?” (developed but fascist) – with the bizarre suggestion that “traumatic experiences” of the war and its aftermath meant that Germany “identified herself with the up-and-coming revolutionary countries.”
2. Some fascists did have democratic aspirations, wishing their party to allow rank-and-file representation (Linz 1976: 21). The leader should embody the

“general will” of the movement. But such quasi-democrats lost out within all fascist movements.

3. The distinction was clearly influenced by U.S. foreign policy of the late Cold War period, which distinguished between friendly “authoritarian” governments (some of which were actually extremely nasty) and enemy “totalitarian” communist governments (some of which were milder than some of the “authoritarian” ones). The decisive criterion was not in reality their degree of authoritarianism, but whether the U.S. government (and U.S. big business) defined them as capitalist or communist, and therefore as friend or foe.
4. Payne’s (1980, 1995: 15) distinction between “conservative rightist,” “radical rightist,” and “fascist” resembles mine, his middle category lumping together most of my two intermediate types. Yet he calls “conservative” some who I place in intermediate categories (e.g., Salazar, Smetona, King Carol of Romania).
5. The Baltic states do not fit perfectly into this typology. Since they had no states before 1918 and no monarchs after, their authoritarians were not strictly “reactionaries.” Nonetheless, the three came to share other attributes of reactionary regimes. Pats was probably the most moderate. His regime probably straddled the borderline between semi- and reactionary authoritarianism.
6. By now there were few urban–rural differences in mortality rates (unlike the nineteenth century).
7. I have not attempted to measure *degrees* of democratization or authoritarianism. Measures based on elections and constitutions cope poorly with the often sham institutions of interwar regimes, while most of the east and south did not remain in one position along the continuum.
8. Taking infant mortality rates would narrow the range of historical comparison. The northwestern countries mentioned reached the 1930 rates of Spain and Italy only between 1890 and 1920. Obviously, their party democracies were even more entrenched by then. My other two indices would give intermediate historical ranges (except that the comparable date for agricultural employment in Britain would be pushed back to the 1820s – when there was mass, successful agitation for suffrage extension).
9. Using this term broadly to include presidents elected in the same competitive way as the members of parliament.
10. By this term I mean that the early northwestern property franchises had rarely distinguished between ethnicities. English, Welsh, and Scottish men of property were considered active citizens, and they rarely organized along ethnic lines (see my forthcoming volume).
11. The next three paragraphs are indebted to Balakrishnan (2000). The main works of Schmitt I paraphrase are *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (1923) and *The Concept of the Political* (1927). I also acknowledge the help of Dylan Riley in discussions of the crisis of parliamentary liberalism.
12. Spain did not fit this model, since the universities were more divided, influenced by older liberal and sometimes secular traditions, as well as by conservative statism (see Chapter 9).

## CHAPTER 3

1. I have excluded the very large number of “others” from the labor force. They may be schoolchildren (since the census is of those age ten or more). I also exclude the military from both sides of the equation. Friuli was a border province housing large armed forces drawn from outside the province.
2. A large group in the labor force cannot reach as high or as low a ratio as a smaller one. Since manual workers generally formed around half of the labor force, even in an *entirely* proletarian party their ratio could not much exceed 2.0. Yet the ratio of a small group – such as students – might exceed 20.0. I could have added a standardizing correction factor into these ratios, but the resulting statistic would lack immediate, intuitive meaning. No single statistic can reveal all.
3. This assumes that the category “lavatori dell’industria” also includes service sector manual workers (though seamen are listed separately). If it does not, then the party membership figures would understate the worker contribution.
4. In almost all countries labels such as “artisan” or “craftsman” are ambiguous. Is this person an employed skilled worker or an independent small master, perhaps employing others? Studies of Nazism used to classify *Handwerker* mainly as the latter, that is, as classic petty bourgeois (e.g., Kater 1983), aiding a lower middle-class theory of fascism. Recent writers (e.g., Mühlberger 1987, 1991) classify most as working-class, aiding a relatively classless theory. The data remain the same; the interpretation changes.

## CHAPTER 4

1. The one area of truly awesome U.S. federal government power, its military, was the only part exempted from the Republican attack. In a third country’s election I witnessed, in 1993, Spain’s ruling Socialist Party probably at the last minute managed to cling to power by ringing popular alarm bells that its rather harmless conservative opponent, the PP, secretly nursed Francoite authoritarian intentions. The PP is now the respectable government of democratic Spain, having won the following election.
2. This accounts for the extraordinarily high estimates of female membership in the “bourgeois” parties sometimes given in the literature. Women supposedly constituted 25 percent of the liberal DDP, 47 percent of the ultraconservative DNVP, and 35 to 60 percent of the center-right DVP (Boak 1990). By including the Nazi auxiliary organizations we would also reach large numbers.
3. I thank Ron Rogowski for his generosity in showing me his files on which he constructed his 1977 article on the *Gauleiter*.
4. My main worry about the representativeness of the samples is that Mühlberger’s (1991) regional samples (perhaps the best data on the NSDAP) do not include any from the east of the country, from either rural Prussia or industrial Saxony.
5. I also share part of Hamilton’s skepticism (1997: 333) regarding Brustein’s methods. His source data are Nazi member file cards. They often record occupations in a desultory way. Of those I have seen for my war criminals sample, I would confidently classify “industrial branch” in only just over half the cases. I am

puzzled from such source data how Brustein managed to separate workers in “metalwares” (the most Nazi group) from workers in “metal products” (the least Nazi group). To proceed from that classification to the assumption that the person’s conception of their own occupational interest would be dominated by the issue of free trade or protectionism also seems quite a leap.

6. Remember, however, that Koshar (1986) has excluded students (who would be predominantly nonproletarian) from his tables, and he tells us that students formed 55 percent of the local Nazi party.
7. Two SA units in rural East Prussia, analyzed by Bessel (1984), differ, dominated by “farmers, young farmers and agricultural supervisors” (35% and 45% of the two units) and “artisans and artisans’ apprentices” (29% and 33%). “Workers” comprised only 12 percent and 8 percent. This encourages Bessel and Jamin (1979) to polemicize against a proletarian interpretation of the SA. But Fischer and Hicks (1980) and Mühlberger (1991: 164–5) have observed that in this easterly region many farm laborers were Slavs, not Germans, unlikely to join the racist SA. Moreover, some “artisans and apprentices” were probably workers. Obviously, there were differences among SA units, since local economies differed. But allowing for both corrections would bring the class composition of the East Prussian SA closer to the SA elsewhere.
8. Jamin’s second sample, of SA leaders who had been purged, had a very low response rate on matters of mobility. Those for whom she was able to collect data did have higher downward mobility. These may have been the real ruffians of the movement – alternatively, perhaps they provided just a biased sample.

#### CHAPTER 5

1. This is a controversial matter in which I have adopted a middle position between viewing capitalists as either “guilty” or “innocent.” In rough descending order of “guilt,” see Mason 1972; Geary 1983, 1990; Hamilton 1982: 393–419, 428–33; Neebe 1981; and Turner 1985.

#### CHAPTER 7

1. Hungarian fascism comprised several small parties and groups whose disunity hindered their development. In the late 1930s the Arrow Cross managed to unite most of them under the leadership of Ferenc Szálasi, though small independent “National Socialist” groups survived into the war period. For the sake of simplicity I refer to the multiple factions of Hungarian fascism as “The Arrow Cross.”
2. If his informant was including tertiary sector workers in this figure, the ratios would decrease to just above parity.

#### CHAPTER 8

1. Schmitter (1974: 117–23) relies heavily on Manoilescu in his brilliant review of theories of corporatism – his title is borrowed from Manoilescu. But he tactfully downplays Manoilescu’s fascist and anti-Semitic leanings.

2. Unless otherwise stated, data on legionary groups derive from Heinen 1986: 384–9 and Veiga 1989: 165–6, 262–6. At present no English-language source offers such data.
3. In Romania this church is found only in Transylvania, the residue of a Habsburg attempt during the eighteenth century to increase Austrian control over Transylvania by merging Catholic and Orthodox doctrines.

## CHAPTER 9

I would like to thank the Fundación Juan March for its generosity in supporting a year's stay at the Instituto Juan March in Madrid, which made possible the research underlying this chapter.

1. The Spanish normally reserve the term “nationalism” for the regional autonomy aspirations, based on a claim to a distinct ethnicity, found especially among Catalans and Basques, but also among some Galicians, Valencians, and others.
2. This resulted from an attempt to avoid single-member constituencies (which might be controlled by *caciques*) yet to ensure workable governmental majorities. The Constitution provided large multimember constituencies covering a whole province or its capital. A party winning a simple majority in the province or capital got 67 to 80 percent of its seats, while minority lists were guaranteed the remaining ones. Most parties thus tried to form electoral pacts, combining lists of candidates who could thus capture most of the seats. The right accomplished such a pact better in 1933, the left in 1936. Thus both had Cortes majorities greater than any real shift in popular support. A different electoral system might have induced more compromise between the two blocs, strengthening the center. The republic was probably not helped by its electoral laws.
3. My account of the ensuing tragedy on the left depends mostly on balancing the diverging accounts of Juliá 1977; Preston 1978: chaps. 4, 5, and 7; Heywood 1990; and Payne 1993: 189–223.
4. True, the left Republicans and the Socialists reacted badly to their defeat in 1933 and asked the president to call new elections (Payne 1993: 181–2). But this was pique of the moment, soon subsiding. The left Republicans never actually organized against democracy.
5. Payne (1993: 208, 255–6, 381–4) claims that the Radicals and other “centrist liberals” were the only true constitutional democrats. He produces no evidence beyond Azaña's short-lived negotiations with the president in October 1934 and one statement by its youth movement (“[we are] leftists, democrats and parliamentarians in that order”) to support his exclusion of the left Republicans, while many of his “centrist liberals” favored severe repression of the left. Payne's account is also soft on CEDA and hard on the socialists (the inverse of Preston's).
6. Once freed of Francoism, this region returned to its preferred politics. Now the bastions of the Socialist Party (the PSOE) reach down south from Madrid to dominate Andalucía and Extremadura.
7. Usually translated as leader, military leader, or head of state, but also seeking to connect Franco to sacred historical figures such as El Cid and the medieval Kings of Asturias – Christian heroes and martyrs.

## CHAPTER 10

1. Italy's Northern League is sometimes classified along with these, but it is really extreme only in its anti-immigrant stance. See Diamanti 1996.
2. So also say Larsen 1998 and Linz 1998. Eatwell seems to disagree, since he concluded a recent book with the claim that "fascism is on the march again" (1995: 286) – though his own evidence seemed to suggest otherwise.
3. And this is the general conclusion of the various essays contained in Larsen 2001.
4. I treat theodemocracy and India more fully in my forthcoming book. See also Jaffrelot 1996: 53–62; Gold 1991; Prayer 1991; and Larsen 2001: 749–58.
5. I discuss Islamism and *jihadis* in my book *Incoherent Empire* (2003), chaps. 4 and 5; see also the major studies of Roy 1994 and Kepel 2002.