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Explaining the Rise of Interwar Authoritarianism and Fascism

INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF STRONG NATION-STATES

To explain fascism we must place it in its context. For three decades it was just one variant of a broader political ideal: "authoritarian nation-statism." In turn, this was just one version of the dominant political ideal of modernity, the strong nation-state. But fascism dominated only in Europe, where it was set inside a single large geographical bloc of authoritarian regimes. Since Europe elsewhere remained liberal democratic, there were "two Europes." The period of fascism's explosive growth was also rent by economic, military, political, and ideological crises. So this chapter discusses the rise of nation-states across the map of Europe, amid four social crises.

State strength has two dimensions, infrastructural and despotic (see Mann 1988). Infrastructural power indicates the capacity of the state to enforce rules and laws by effective infrastructures covering its territories and peoples. An infrastructurally strong state may be democratic or authoritarian. The democratic United States has more infrastructural state power than did the authoritarian Soviet Union. This type of power is power "through" people, not power "over" them. But despotic power refers to the ability of state elites to take their own decisions "over" their subjects/citizens. Virtually all modern states have come to possess greater infrastructural powers than their historical predecessors, while some have also wielded formidable despotic powers. The combination of a substantial amount of both powers is distinctive to authoritarian states of the twentieth century, which I am here seeking to explain. How did the combination arise? The answer is by exaggerating ordinary modern political ideals.

By the twentieth century, Europe already contained "sovereign nation-states." That is, each of these states was claiming political sovereignty over certain territories, deriving legitimacy from the "people" or "nation"

inhabiting them (many were still multiethnic, of course). Yet nation-states are young. From the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchs were claiming state sovereignty in foreign policy, "upper-class nations" were emerging, and religious wars might produce "nations of the soul." But the mass of the population became real members of the "nation" more recently. States up to the eighteenth century actually did rather little. They conducted diplomacy and small foreign wars, they wielded the highest level of justice and repression. They formally regulated foreign trade and possessed economic monopolies normally subcontracted out to others. Some controlled the price of grain in order to avoid rioting near the capital. Only if buttressed by established and pliant churches did states penetrate much of social life outside their capitals and "home counties." Yet eighteenth-century states did monopolize the function of military violence, and this now surged. Around 1700, states absorbed perhaps 5 percent of GNP in peacetime, 10 percent in wartime. By 1760, the wartime extraction rate had risen to the range 15 to 25 percent. By 1810, they took 25 to 35 percent and conscripted about 5 percent of the population. These rates (calculated in Mann 1993: chap. 11) are similar to those of the world wars of the twentieth century and to the highest rates in the world today, those of Israel and North Korea. Such comparisons enable us to appreciate the scale of the eighteenth century transformation. From being fairly insignificant, states loomed large in the lives of their subjects through tax gatherers and recruiting sergeants. They aroused subjects out of their historic political indifference to demand representative rights. Thus did membership in the nation, "citizenship," first become the modern political ideal.

Yet even in the nineteenth century, few saw states as the route to achieve many important social purposes. Freedom was mostly seen as freedom from, not through, the state. Only with the Jacobins during the French Revolution was the notion expressed that a stronger state and a more activist conception of citizenship might be socially and morally desirable. Jacobinism was defeated, but state expansion then took a more surreptitious route, fueled by the development of industrial capitalism. States sponsored road and canal building and took over poor relief. France continued to favor more state coordination of economic activity than either Britain or the United States did, while in Germany came a challenge to laissez-faire through the protectionist theories of Friedrich List. By the late century some economic theory had become a little more statist, with the state beginning to coordinate banking and industrial investment. In the late nineteenth century came further state organization of railroads, mass education, public health, and finally the first stirrings of welfare programs. These were all growths in

infrastructural power. Since these were all desirable goods, to be paid for by undesirable taxes, more and more of the population became interested in representative government and in citizenship – that is, in reducing despotic powers.

These state activities also had the unintended consequence of consolidating networks of social interaction, "civil societies," substantially bounded by the territories of each state. This fueled an implicit sense of nationhood – less an ideology of nationalism than a recognition that one actually lived in the same society under the same state as one's fellow-subjects/citizens. But explicit nationalism also strengthened during the same period. In the northwestern countries of Europe and in European colonies in which "rule by the people" had first been secured, "the people" had been limited to propertied males, recognized as having diverse "interests," as gentlemen, merchants, manufacturers, artisans, and so on. The citizen body was internally stratified and existed above lower classes, who were entitled to some but not all the rights of citizenship. The people or nation was counterposed to reactionary old regimes, yet it was internally diverse, and it was not usually hostile to other nations.

Yet a more aggressive nationalism grew during the nineteenth century (Mommsen 1990). To some extent it grew because aspirations for representative government became dominated by the notion that the *whole* people must rule, since it shared certain virtues and qualities needed for citizenship. It especially grew across the more easterly regions dominated by "multiethnic" dynastic Empires – Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman. Here conflicts between the imperial rulers and the locals were transformed by demands for democracy into conflicts between supposed ethnic/national communities. Local disprivileged elites claiming representative rights for themselves, faced with pressures from below, sought to mobilize the "whole" people against the imperial ethnicity and its local ethnic clients. This fostered acceptance of Corradini's notion that "the proletarian nation" might rise up against oppressors. Croats, Slovenes, and others might resent Turkish or Serb domination; Romanians might resent Hungarians; Slovaks might resent Czechs; and almost everyone might resent the dominant Germans, Russians, and Turks. The imperialist Germans, Russians, and Turks (and later the Hungarians) then responded with their own counternationalisms. Jews suffered because they were cosmopolitan and therefore considered antinational. But anti-Semitism was also entwined with other nationalist conflicts: Czech anti-Semitism was propelled by anti-German sentiment, Slovak by anti-Magyar, while Magyar and Austrian anti-Semitism was propelled by yearnings for imperial revisionism. In all these cases Jews were hated partly because of

their supposed alliance with some other national enemy. Nationalism, at first an idealistic alliance directed internally against "feudal" rulers, turned aggressive inside and out against other "nations."

Thus emerged the ideal of the organic as opposed to the liberal, stratified nation-state (or "ethnic nationalism," as opposed to "civic nationalism"). Consider Austria (analyzed by Schmidt-Hartmann 1988, and discussed further in my forthcoming volume). In 1882 three young Austrian politicians propounded the "Linz Program," which was intended to found a new German People's Party. The program combined German nationalism, universal suffrage, and progressive social legislation. It denounced equally liberalism, laissez-faire capitalism, and Marxian socialism. The three men declared that whereas liberals advocated a constitution enshrining the conflict of interests, they upheld the "substance" of democracy. Their legitimacy, they said, was grounded in the unity of the people, "the good of all," "the interests of the people." The projected party never materialized. The three split and went off to found their own parties. Adler became a leader of the Social Democrats, Lueger founded the Christian Socials, and Schönerer founded what became the Pan-German Party – these were the three mass parties of interwar Austria, generating rather totalizing social movements, and two of them generating fascist movements (to be encountered in Chapter 6).

These young Austrians were endorsing an *organic* conception of the people and state. The people, they said, was one and indivisible, united, integral. Thus its state need not be grounded on the institutionalization of conflict between contending interests. One national movement could represent the *whole* people, ultimately transcending any conflict of interests among social groups within it. Class conflict and sectional interests were to be not compromised but *transcended*. This seemed a fine ideal, but it had its dark side (discussed at much greater length in my forthcoming volume). All states actually contained minorities who had their own distinct cultural traits. Some had cultural links to another foreign state, which their own ethnicity dominated and which they considered to be their "homeland." Organic nationalists looked suspiciously at these people. They were considered to have divided loyalties and so should be excluded from full membership in the nation. So organic nationalists came to believe in (1) an enduring national character, soul, or spirit, distinguishable from that of other nations, (2) their right to a state that would ultimately express this, and (3) their right to exclude minorities with different characters, who would only weaken the nation.

This is the familiar story of "the rise and rise" of nations and modern states – to which I have contributed myself (Mann 1986, 1993: esp. chaps. 10

and 11). Yet the expansion of these national networks of interaction proceeded *alongside* expanding "transnational" power relations – industrial capitalism and attendant ideologies such as liberalism and socialism, plus the broader cultural networks provided by European/Christian/"white" senses of collective identity. Property was everywhere overwhelmingly "private." No state intervened much in the economy, except to levy tariffs on imports for economic protection, to coordinate communications networks (especially railways), and to regulate banking. Around the European semi-periphery arose further notions of state-aided "late development" policies, but these were not very important before 1914. Thus much of social life remained outside the sphere of competence of the nation-state, even during its great period of expansion. Few expected much more from the state.

Nor did most politicians. Before 1914, most leftists were committed to decentralized versions of democracy and were ambivalent about the state. On the far left, residual Jacobinism was outweighed by profound distrust of all existing states and of the nationalism that supported them. Socialist ideology recognized only transnational classes (though practices often differed). Marx's notorious silence on the postrevolutionary state, his glib statements on how the state would "wither away" and on how the working class had no nation, were examples of the left's indifference toward the emerging nation-state. Marxists hoped to sweep states away, after using them briefly to change property forms. Anarcho-syndicalists felt it was safer for the left to bypass states altogether. True, leftists wanted the state to relieve poverty and to expand free education. Nonetheless, prewar welfare reformism was usually led not by socialists but by "bourgeois" left-liberals who felt more at home in a state that had long enfranchised them. Thus it tended to be German "Socialists of the [Professor's] Chair," British "New Liberals," French Republican Radicals, and Russian liberal *zemstvo* intelligentsia, more than the Marxian or syndicalist left, who looked to an expanded state to sponsor economic, cultural, and moral development. But they all saw this as helping to bring greater democracy. They wanted a reduction in despotic powers.

Things were a little different on the right, since extreme nationalists had emerged before 1914. They were already urging old regimes to mobilize the nation to defeat the corrosive forces of liberalism and socialism. As Sternhell emphasizes, many fascist ideas were already circulating before 1914. But though they excited some intellectuals, they had been harnessed to mass movements, which had been first developed by leftist parties and then copied by just a few nationalist parties. They were held in check by old regimes and churches who still controlled most states and most votes

and who still looked askance at mass mobilization. The nation, the masses, were to be spoken for by elites, not activated. As Eley (1980) emphasizes, rightist nationalist pressure groups were beginning to alarm German conservatives and destabilize German foreign policy, but their role in domestic policy was much smaller. Austria probably saw the most developed mass movements of nationalism (Schorske 1981: chap 3). Though state functions were widening, most conservatives saw the state as little more than the preserver of order and the aggrandizer of territory. As on the left, the state was not generally seen as "the bearer of a moral project" (to repeat Perez-Diaz's resonant phrase). Nationalists were beginning to oppress minorities, while a moderate increase in the "infrastructural power" of the state was considered desirable. But these had definite limits and there was no real drive toward increasing the despotic power of the state. Despotism and authoritarianism were generally seen as characteristics of "old regimes" that would eventually wither away in the face of modernity. In 1914 few could have envisaged a fascist or even a milder authoritarian future.

Had Europe remained at peace, state expansion would doubtless have gradually continued and states would have acquired more infrastructural powers. Industrial capitalism would have continued to require state assistance. The enfranchisement of workers and women would have fostered the development of the welfare state. A "moderate nation-statism" would have emerged anyway, amended by state-led "late development" theory on the semi-periphery. But the Great War intervened. It militarized the nation-state and provided an economic model of how state intervention and planning might achieve economic development. It provided a "paramilitary" model of collective social action, weakened traditional conservatism, destroyed the multinational empires that were the main rivals to the nation-state, and strengthened aggressive nationalism against the enemy. With the coming to power of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Ludendorff in 1916 came the signal that war was now to be "total" – to be conducted not by a gentlemanly old regime but by a nation mobilized for military and economic service. Businessmen, labor leaders, civil servants, generals, and politicians served alongside each other in a single state-coordinated administration. This did not happen as effectively in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and this was blamed on the strength of their old regimes (and on the "unpatriotic" stance of their socialists). Even noncombatant states in Northern Europe were compelled by blockade and submarine warfare to intervene in major ways (especially to introduce rationing, a radical extension of state powers). In Europe only neutral Spain and Portugal continued as before, their old regimes and weak states still legitimate. Yet most states had substituted

effectively for private and market actions in achieving massive collective purposes on behalf of the nation. Modern statism had arrived, alongside modern nationalism.

Though wartime apparatuses of intervention were dismantled afterward, the infrastructurally powerful state was here to stay. The franchise was extended and governments were expected to alleviate postwar unemployment and housing shortages. Social citizenship was added to political citizenship. More ambitious schemes of social reconstruction and economic development began to circulate among technocrats, including economists. On the left socialists now vanquished their anarcho-syndicalist rivals (except in neutral Spain) and began to see revolution and reform alike as accomplished through more state action. Prewar visions of a democracy largely bypassing the state seemed obsolete. In Russia, war and civil war made the Bolsheviks more ardent statists. Elsewhere liberalism mutated into social democracy and moderate statism crept forward.

But most of the drama occurred on the right. Mainly under the banner of increasing statism, it swept into power over one-half of interwar Europe. Its eruption was a surprise, for the peace settlements of 1918 had been dominated by liberals. President Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed the coming of the "democratic world revolution." The Versailles delegates replaced the Austro-Hungarian and parts of the Russian and Ottoman Empires with a dozen putative democracies. Though these tended to enshrine the rule of a single dominant nation, their constitutions guaranteed the rights of minorities. Some liberals and socialists even hoped the rest of the world – colonies and dependent states – might soon follow suit. A new world order of mild and democratic nation-states seemed inaugurated.

Indeed, after brief postwar turbulence, Europe did seem headed that way. In late 1920 all but one of its twenty-eight states states had constitutions enshrining parliamentary elections, competing political parties, and guarantees for minorities. Most suffrages still excluded women (some excluded many men), some executives had powers rivaling legislatures, and political practices were often at odds with constitutional norms. But liberal democracy seemed the coming, modern ideal. The sole deviant case, the Soviet Union, actually claimed to be more genuinely democratic. The omens for tolerant nationalism were not so good. Millions of minority refugees were fleeing back to their national homelands under pressure from their former states (this is dealt with in my forthcoming volume). But, overall, the Great Powers believed the liberal democratic nation-state *was* the twentieth century.

By the end of the twentieth century, in Europe as in the west as a whole, it was. The northwest of Europe has been firmly liberal or social democratic



Map 2.1. The two interwar Europes.

for many decades, as have been the political institutions (at first for whites only) of their major settler ex-colonies. Southern European authoritarian regimes were gone by 1975. The communist regimes of the east collapsed suddenly in 1989–91. At the end of the millennium, *all* of Europe's states were formally committed to multiparty democracy, though some regimes in former communist countries had dubious credentials and ethnic tensions surfaced in a few. But Yugoslavia seems an alien exception to most Europeans. Though democracy proves hard to export to other parts of the world, it dominates the west.

But between 1920 and 1945 the liberal democratic nation-state retreated, battered by authoritarians. By 1938, fifteen of Europe's twenty-seven parliamentary regimes were rightist dictatorships, most claiming to embody a single organic nation, curtailing minority rights. Map 2.1 specifies the date each had its main coup. In other continents the four white-majority former British colonies – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – had democracies for whites only (only New Zealand then allowed free representation of most nonwhites; South Africa and Rhodesia

also had impeccable parliamentary institutions for whites only). But the two major Asian states, Japan and China, had succumbed to authoritarianism; while in Latin America only Uruguay, Colombia, and Costa Rica stayed consistently democratic, with most regimes fluctuating. So the interwar period saw two fairly evenly matched global and European blocs, one liberal democratic, the other organic-authoritarian. Both sought infrastructurally stronger states; only the latter sought greater despotic powers as well. The period then culminated in total warfare between the two. How do we explain the rise of interwar authoritarianism over half, but not all, of the relatively advanced part of the world and of Europe? Answering this question is a necessary preliminary to understanding a second question: Why did fascism arise? The map of Europe gives us our first clues.

GEOGRAPHY: THE TWO EUROPES

Map 2.1, the political map of interwar Europe, reveals two subcontinents, "two Europes," one liberal democratic, the other authoritarian. The two Europes were geographically distinct, one occupying the northwest of the continent, the other its center, east, and south. Except for Czechoslovakia (which slightly curtailed the rights of its German and Slovak minorities), liberal democracy comprised a single bloc of eleven countries across the northwest: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and France. Almost all the other liberal democracies of the world were former British colonies. Thus the liberal democratic bloc comprised three socio-cultural zones – "Nordic," "Anglo-Saxon," and "Low Country" – linked through a sea-trading economy and political and ideological similarities. They had embraced constitutional rule well before 1900. The Anglo-Saxon world spoke English; the Nordic countries (except for Finland) spoke mutually intelligible dialects of the same language group; and across the whole region, except for France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia, elites might often converse in English.

Apart from Ireland they also had rather depoliticized religions. Ten of the sixteen were majority Protestant. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, and Ireland were majority Catholic, while the Netherlands and Switzerland were divided between the two religions. They included all the majority Protestant countries of Europe except for Germany, Estonia, and Latvia. But they included *all* the Protestant countries where church-state links had weakened significantly over the past century. Dutch and Swiss Catholicism were also independent of the state, while Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and France were rather secular Catholic countries (and the Czech church was in conflict

with the Vatican). The northwest shared a great deal besides just the liberal democratic nation-state, and its geographical cohesion permitted the flow of common ideological messages. As we see below, its cultural solidarity was to matter considerably.

Most of the organic-authoritarian family also formed a single geographic bloc, though it was formed of two rather distinct historic socio-cultural zones: "Latin/Mediterranean" and "Slav/East and Central European." Their languages were more diverse and they were not a trading bloc. But (apart from most of Germany, Estonia, and Latvia) they had remained with the two early Christian churches: They comprised most of the Catholic countries and all the Eastern Orthodox countries in Europe. And they comprised all the European countries except for Ireland retaining intense church-state links. Again, these cultural solidarities – and the cultural fault lines within this zone – will prove important in the generation of authoritarianism and fascism.

Around this "continental divide" between the two Europes we can even detect a "frontier zone," indicated on the map. Most of it was comprised by two large countries, France and Germany. These were the swing countries that might have gone the other way. France might have gone authoritarian and Germany might have remained parliamentary, since both saw prolonged struggle between democratic and authoritarian forces, as they had during the previous period. The main prewar proto-fascist theorists (Maurras, Barrès, Sorel) were French, and France had the largest interwar authoritarian parties of both right and left in the northwest. As the power of Nazi Germany rose, the realization of French weakness grew and conservatives began to split over possible solutions. Fascist voices became louder. Had the election due in 1940 been held (and in peacetime), the quasi-fascist PSF might have won over 100 parliamentary seats, suggests Soucy (1991). Later, the Vichy collaborating regime had considerable domestic support. Conversely, the Weimar Republic contained an advanced democracy that might have survived. And the eventual outcome of the struggle in France and Germany might also be explicable in terms of geography, for their political "heartlands" lay close to the "other" geographic bloc. Paris and the surrounding Ile de France lie in the north, while France's advanced economic regions were mostly in the northwest. France was as integrated into the northwestern British/Low Countries free trade/democratic/Protestant sphere as into the more authoritarian Catholic south. Conversely, the core of the German state was in Berlin and Prussia, in the east of the country. German history is often described as the hijacking by Prussia of its liberal southwest and its free-trading northern ports.

The "frontier zone" is also represented in this book by the country that saw the most prolonged struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, Spain. Chapter 9 shows just how enduring and closely contested this was. There are also three politically borderline countries – for there were somewhat imperfect democracies to be found in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria before 1934. Moreover, authoritarian movements in the northwest thrived only in divided settings inside and adjacent to this frontier zone. In ethnically divided Czechoslovakia, the German Sudeten Party enveloped the German minority to reach 15 percent of the national vote in 1935; in Slovakia a further 10 percent went to the Hlinka Party. In linguistically divided Belgium Christus Rex polled 11.5 percent in 1936 (mostly among French-speakers), while the Flemish VNV achieved 7.1 percent. But when the Rexist leaders embraced fascism, their vote fell in 1939 to 4.4 percent, and when the VNV accepted Nazi subsidies their support ebbed. The Finnish Lapua Movement/IKL could exploit the right's victory in the civil war and anti-Soviet irredentism to achieve 8.3 percent in 1936, though this fell to 6.6 percent in 1939. In the religiously divided Netherlands, the NSB polled 7.9 percent in 1935, but dropped to insignificance by 1939 as it drew close to Hitler. These authoritarian movements were not nearly as popular as those further to the east and south, but they were of some significance.

Yet authoritarians situated further inside the northwest bloc received few votes. Fascists and fellow-travelers languished, hovering around 2 percent of the vote in Norway, 1.5 percent in Switzerland, and well under 1 percent in Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Lindstrom 1985: 115; Linz 1976: 89–91; Payne 1980: 126–35; 1995: 290–312). Though some intellectuals and elites played with authoritarian and fascist ideas (I quoted some of them in Chapter 1), and though there was intermittent grumbling about the "weakness" and divisions of parliamentary democracy, the decisive factor was that conservatives went populist but remained democratic, content to mobilize the masses on mild nationalism, religion, deference, and a claim to greater expertise at managing a capitalist economy (Mann 1993) Conservatives resisted authoritarian rightists, but social democrats also resisted revolutionaries. Thus both were able to process and to compromise their conflicts through democratic institutions, which deepened as a result.

Yet authoritarians prospered in the center, east, and south of the continent. In Austrian, German, and Spanish free elections they reached near 40 percent of the votes. Across the half-free elections of Eastern Europe they won convincingly. Had fascists been freer to organize, they would have garnered more votes (as we see in Chapters 7 and 8 in Hungary and Romania).

We cannot say that the authoritarians regimes had majority support, since they manipulated executive powers and some used coercive powers during elections. But they had a much more powerful appeal than in the northwest. There were indeed two Europes, one firmly liberal democratic, the other attracted by organic-authoritarian visions of the nation-state – with a politically divided and oscillating frontier zone between them.

The strength of such geographic blocs makes me doubt three common explanations of authoritarianism and fascism. One treats countries as unique and provides what is in effect a "nationalist" explanation. The power of the nation-state has turned many scholars inward, to study one country, usually their own. They favor explanations in terms of "national peculiarities," such as the *Sonderweg*, Germany's "special path" toward Nazism. Historians of Spain emphasize memories of the glorious Siglo de Oro, followed by imperial decline, resulting in a cankered church, an inflated officer corps, unique regionalisms, a violent south, and so on. If I could read Albanian, I could doubtless learn of unique Albanian predispositions for authoritarianism. True, local factors explain the *details* of each national outcome. Nazism was distinctively German and Francoism was Spanish. I can't imagine them in any other country. Yet Map 2.1 reveals very powerful macro-regional effects cutting right across national boundaries. These meant that Spain might go authoritarian, Albania was likely to, and Ireland was not. Ireland had a powerful, reactionary Catholic Church and experienced an actual civil war in the 1920s. Yet Ireland was in the northwest, inheriting some democratic British institutions and sharing a language and population exchanges with democratic Britain and the United States. Albanians did not live amid a democratic civilization; the Irish did. Thus the rival armies of the Irish civil war actually turned into two rival electoral parties – and these two still dominate Irish elections today. We need local details – and they proliferate in my case-study chapters – but we also need a more macro approach.

A second approach is also implicitly nationalist. It divides the continent into nation-states and treats each as a single case in a multivariate comparative analysis. It mobilizes national statistics to test hypotheses suggesting, for example, that fascism emerged in backward countries or in those with rapidly expanding universities. I utilize such statistics later. Yet the method is limited by the brute geography we have just glimpsed. Are all the more backward countries or those with expanding universities so clumped together on the map? Almost certainly not. More likely, geography also provides distinct communication networks of contiguity, so that distinct ideologies are diffused to different degrees across different regions of Europe, somewhat independently of level of development or university structure.

The third approach is therefore a regional one, identifying macro-regional cultures – "the Mediterranean," "Eastern Europe," "Central Europe," and so on – as causally decisive. For example, this approach correctly notes that the kind of organicism that centered on racist anti-Semitism was largely confined to Central and Eastern Europe, failing to much penetrate the south. Yet authoritarianism as a whole was diffused much more broadly than this. It filled half of Europe. It did not reflect "the Special Case of Central Europe," as Newman proclaims (1970: 29–34), nor "East European late development," as Janos (1989) and Berend (1998: 201, 343–5) argue, or even "partial or backward development" in general, as Gregor suggests (1969: xii–xiv).[1] Though all these macro-regional theories contain some truth, fascism was more general, yet also more spotty, than these regional theories. For the five major fascist movements (in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Italy) were scattered right across Europe and its levels of development. We need a more general explanation for authoritarianism and perhaps a more particular explanation for fascism. I first examine the dependent variable of regime type.

TYPES OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Our explanatory problem lies on the political right. Across the whole of "Greater Europe" the Soviet Union was the only leftist authoritarian regime. All other authoritarian regimes were viewed as being of the political right – though we see below that fascism was only ambiguously so. So they had certain common features. All these regimes worshipped order and protected private property; all embraced an authoritarian statism, rejecting federalism, democracy, and their supposed "vices": disorderly class conflict, political corruption, and moral decline.[2] They also came to embrace organic nationalism. The nation must be "one and indivisible," cleansed of subverters of national unity. Thus the regimes repressed socialists and liberals committed to internationalism, and they repressed ethnic, regional, and religious minorities who supposedly had loyalties to other countries. Most authoritarians relied on the military and police powers of the old regime; fascists preferred their own paramilitaries. But once they had rejected peaceful compromise of differences, they had all chosen the path of violence – military or paramilitary power – to solve political problems.

Yet the family members were varied (for general surveys, see Polonsky 1975; Payne 1980; Lee 1987 and Berend 1998). Some scholars divide them into two groups: "fascists" and a much larger group labeled either "authoritarian conservatives" or just "authoritarians" (e.g., Linz 1976; Blinkhorn

1990). This is insufficient. First, though it accepts that with fascism comes a change of direction, to a distinctive combination of rightism with radicalism, it does not recognize that this comes as the final stage of a broader problem faced by rightists: the need to cope with organized political pressure from the masses. Modern authoritarianism departed from despotic regimes of the past in trying to absorb the mass pressures from below characterizing all twentieth-century politics. Second, it yields an "authoritarian" group that is too big and diverse. The Franco regime, often blandly labeled "authoritarian conservative," probably killed over 100,000 people in cold blood. The similarly labeled Metaxas regime in Greece killed perhaps a hundred.[3] Third, regimes became nastier through this period. We need more distinctions to cope with variations between countries and through time. I distinguish four ascending degrees of authoritarianism within the family. Of course, since this is a continuum, any boundaries between types are a little arbitrary, and each type includes rather diverse regimes. Remember also that these are regimes, not movements. As Kallis (2000) notes, regimes do not simply express ideologies. They also embody processes that he calls political consolidation, policy formation, and scope of change sought. These all involve questions of political practicability as well as ideology (cf. Paxton 1998).[4]

Semi-authoritarian Regimes

These regimes were the mildest and most conservative. They tried to hold on to late nineteenth-century methods of rule. They were essentially "dual states" in which an elected legislature and a nonelected executive both wielded considerable powers – hence the "semi-authoritarian" label. Pressure from below was deflected by manipulating elections and parliaments. The executive fixed elections, bought deputies, appointed cabinets, and repressed "extremists" under emergency powers. Yet parliaments, law courts, and the press retained some freedoms. Monarchies dominated here, aided by traditional clientelist conservative and liberal parties. "Statism" here meant loyalty to the existing "old regime." Nationalism was kept on a tight leash, hardly organic. Where political enemies were cleansed, this was more by intimidation and imprisonment than by murder, except during the short postwar period of revolutionary turbulence. Once the regimes felt basically secure, they did not rely on much murder and they restrained tendencies to pogroms against Jews – Jews were too useful. Though some manipulated popular prejudice against minorities, they were usually only discriminatory, not seeking to expel them. Though they had strong militaries, foreign policy

remained cautious. Fiscal and social policies were also conservative and procapitalist. These were resisting modernity as well as democracy.

Examples are most of the early interwar regimes: Greece up to the Metaxas coup, Romanian regimes of the 1920s and early '30s, the Spanish regime of Alfonso XIII up to 1923, the Admiral Horthy/Count Bethlen regimes in Hungary in the 1920s, Chancellor Seipel's Austrian Christian Social government in the late 1920s (covertly subverting freedoms), the pre-fascist Italian governments of Salandra and Sonnino, the pre-Nazi regimes of Brüning, von Schleicher, and von Papen. Fascist ideology had little influence on them, and they were mostly quite mild and pragmatic – compared with what followed. Yet none lasted for long.

Semi-reactionary Authoritarian Regimes

Here the old regime (centered on monarchy, military, and church) coped with popular pressure by upping the level of repression. It overthrew or emasculated the legislature, ending the dualism noted above. Repression alternated with scapegoating discriminatory measures aimed at leftists, minorities, or Jews. These regimes still feared the masses. Nonetheless, they were also making limited modernist moves – hence they were only semi-reactionary. They advocated organic nationalism, though they remained wary of mobilizing the people behind it. Fascist ideology had some influence here. Some (e.g., Salazar, Pilsudski, Primo de Rivera) cultivated one-party rule, mostly imitating Mussolini, but the party was controlled from above, its role being to domesticate rather than to excite the masses. Paramilitaries might be organized, but more to parade than to fight, and so the army retained its effective monopoly over the means of military violence. Foreign policy remained cautious, economic policy remained procapitalist and decidedly developmentalist. Primo and Pilsudski even sought social reform, though their conservative supporters resisted, inducing Primo's fall (see Chapter 9) and Pilsudski's move rightward.

This was the most widespread type of interwar regime. Examples are the Hungarian governments of Admiral Horthy and others through most of the 1930s (see Chapter 7), King Carol's "directed democracy" in Romania in the late 1930s (Chapter 8), General Primo de Rivera in Spain in 1923–30 (though he also introduced many corporatist elements; see Chapter 9), General Pilsudski in Poland in 1926–35 followed by other officers until 1939, the three army-based Baltic regimes (Smetona in Lithuania in 1926–39, Ulmanis in Latvia in 1934–9, and Pats in Estonia in 1934–9),[5] King Zog in Albania in 1928–39, King Alexander and the Regent Paul in Yugoslavia

during the 1930s, the regime of King Boris in Bulgaria from 1935, Metaxas's rule in Greece in 1936–8, Dolfuss's rule in Austria from 1932 to early 1934 (Chapter 6), and the Portuguese military rule of 1928–32.

Corporatist Regimes

About a third of the regimes then drifted further. They sought to increase statism, mobilize organic nationalism, and intensify scapegoating of minorities and leftists. Most fundamentally, they began to borrow substantially from fascist organization and ideology, often under pressure from actual fascist movements. The borrowings were more of "top-down" statism than "bottom-up" paramilitarism. "Corporatism" conveys this sense of an integrated, hierarchical organization, though it is not a perfect label since it tends to smooth over the tensions often appearing between its two main constituencies, old regime authoritarians and more "radical" nationalists. Though procapitalist, some corporatist regimes developed patriarchal welfare policies and intervened in the economy to sponsor growth (though others preferred order and stability to capitalist dynamism). The army remained the regime's bedrock, retaining most of its monopoly of military power, yielding only a little to paramilitarism. Foreign policy combined bellicose nationalist rhetoric with diplomacy that was in reality rather cautious.

Examples are the "hyphenated fascist" regimes, in which fascist tendencies are undercut by another tendency: for example, the Metaxas "monarcho-fascism" in Greece after 1938, Dolfuss's "clerico-fascism" or "Austro-fascism" from 1934 (see Chapter 6), King Carol's "monarcho-fascism" in Romania from 1938, followed between 1940 and 1944 by General Antonescu's "military fascism" (Chapter 8). There was also the French Vichy regime, Hungarian "radical rightist" cabinets in World War II (Chapter 7), Salazar's combination of fascism and *deus, patria et familia*, and the Franco dictatorship up to the early 1960s. The Metaxas dictatorship was the most moderate: a paramilitary youth movement and corporatist trappings, mass arrests but few killings, and little pressure on minorities. He purged monarchists but not the monarch himself, and his foreign policy steered carefully between Germany and Britain (Kofas 1983). Elsewhere, the Japanese Imperial government was of this type after 1931 (though it also contained fascist elements); Chiang Kai-shek aspired to this but lacked the infrastructural power over China to implement it.

Of course, these are ideal types and the real-world distinctions between regimes were often rather blurry. Some parliamentary forms were

maintained even when the balance of power had shifted firmly to the executive – as, for example, in Hungary and Romania in the late 1930s. Indeed, Hungary not only retained a parliament. Until 1944 this actually contained socialist deputies, uniquely among all the Axis countries. The division between reactionary and organic corporatist regimes was also sometimes blurred – as it was between the latter and fascism. Primo de Rivera might be considered corporatist rather than reactionary. In the Franco and, to a lesser extent, the Salazar regimes, fascists often did the dirty work; whereas Carol, Antonescu, and Horthy all discovered that parts of their own governments had been captured by fascists. Here was vigorous rivalry between corporatists and fascists.

Fascist Regimes

Fascism provided a discontinuity, reversing the flow of power by adding to corporatism a "bottom-up" mass movement centered on paramilitarism and electoralism, while also increasing coercive powers from the top. Paramilitarism flourished amid an obvious decay in the loyalty and cohesion of the state's armed forces. The army became split, with many soldiers' fascist and paramilitary sympathies eroding discipline, threatening the state's monopoly of military power. This also created a basic tension between "bottom-up" paramilitarism and electioneering and a "top-down" statism centered on the "leadership principle." This tension prevented fascist regimes, coming into power with help from old regime elites, from settling down into being simply extreme rightist, giving them their "radical" character. In fact, fascist leaders came from all parts of the political spectrum, many being former socialists (such as Mussolini, Déat, or Mosley). Fascism embraced paramilitarism at home and militarism abroad. It also intervened massively in the economy, with definite fascist theories of economic development. Yet fascists' relations with conservatives and capitalists remained ambiguous, each seeming to need the other.

We do not have many cases of fascist regimes. The Nazis and the Italian fascists were the only two regimes seizing power and holding on to it for some years. Though Austria had proportionately more fascists than either, they were divided into two opposed movements and could not seize power until 1938, on the backs of Hitler's troops. Hungarian and Romanian fascists were equally well supported, but they were also heavily persecuted. They did succeed in infiltrating the ruling regimes and they came to power briefly in 1944 at the end of the war. We see here (as also in the case of Spain) the importance of relations between fascists and other authoritarian

rightists: fascist coups depended on the balance of power between them. But the influence of fascism was also much broader. Corporatist regimes were stealing fascist ideas in order to be able to repress real fascists, and so survive. Then amid wartime conditions other organic nationalists flirted with fascism and joined the Axis Powers – the Slovakian Hlinkas, the Croatian Ustasha, and nationalists in the Baltic states, Belarus, and the Ukraine. But the Italians and the Nazis were easily the most important. Their successes influenced others. Mussolini's 1922 March on Rome came so early that all authoritarian regimes had Italian models to copy and adapt. Hitler's geopolitical power carried Nazi influence, though not for long. He brought a world war that destroyed them all. Since fascist regimes never became securely institutionalized, we don't really know what enduring fascism would have looked like. Would it have continued to embody the factionalism and zig-zagging of the Mussolini regime or Hitler's persistent if slightly chaotic radicalization? Or would stable corporatist/syndicalist structures have emerged? And so in discussing fascism, the most extreme of the authoritarian family, I am discussing less actual regimes than the future regimes envisaged by the larger fascist movements. The fascist problem I seek to explain, therefore, is how these future ideals arose and became powerful, against the backdrop of the authoritarian regimes distinguished above.

My typology generates three basic questions: Why did one-half of Europe continue to move further along this authoritarian scale? Why did only a few movements reach as far as fascism for their ideals? and Why did only two of them succeed in seizing power unaided? Not many writers clearly distinguish these three questions. Most explanations link all three to serious social crises erupting in the early twentieth century: ideological, economic, military, and political. These correspond to the four sources of social power I have analyzed in the two volumes of *The Sources of Social Power* (1986, 1993). We see below that notions of general crisis do best at explaining the general authoritarian surge, less well at explaining the rise of fascist movements, and least well at explaining fascist coups.

ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMIC CRISIS

Economic power relations derive from the human need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the resources of nature for subsistence. This generates economic institutions and social classes arising out of production and market relations, cooperating yet simultaneously conflicting with one another. Those who control the means of production and exchange possess crucial power resources that allow them a measure of more general social

power. Yet severe class conflict may challenge their power. The time and place discussed here was dominated by the capitalist mode of production in its industrial phase. So I discuss the development and crises of industrial capitalism, its class conflicts, and their degree of responsibility for the rise of authoritarianism and fascism.

Though economic power relations have always been important in human affairs, social theory in our materialist age has often seemed obsessed by them. Economic explanations of fascism have been the most popular ones, and I discuss them at greatest length. Long-term causes of authoritarianism and fascism are traced to capitalist "backwardness" or "late development," short-term causes to economic recessions and surges in class conflict. All are believed to have helped undermine the legitimacy of existing governments and increased strife to the point where authoritarian solutions seemed plausible – especially to those with ready access to the means of coercion. I begin with long-term causes.

(1) *Late development theory* suggests that economically backward countries were lured into authoritarian politics by statist theories of "late development." A variant form of the argument links this to nationalism. Backward countries feel exploited by developed ones, and so nationalists urge their countries to "stand by ourselves alone" with economic policies embodying autarchy and protection – which also increased statism.

These theories require that the authoritarian countries are the economic laggards, and this is indeed so. Scholars have mobilized batteries of socio-economic statistics to show that the higher the GNP, urbanization, literacy, and so on, the more democratic the regime. Correlations between indices of development and liberal democracy usually range between $r = .60$ and $r = .85$. By squaring this we find that level of development explains between one-third and two-thirds of the variance found in levels of liberal democracy – quite a robust finding in macro-sociology, where most cross-national statistical comparisons contain considerable error and "noise" (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 13–20; Maravall 1997). Comparisons among interwar European countries come to the same conclusion (Janos 1989; Stephens 1989; Gomez-Navarro 1991). Does this argument also hold for the two interwar geographic blocs identified above?

In Table 2.1, I have used four indices of socio-economic development: GNP per capita, proportion of the economically active population in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries, the infant mortality rate, and the per capita number of items sent annually through the mail. GNP per capita measures economic development, while agricultural employment measures lack of it. Neither measure is perfect, since data quality and categorization vary

Table 2.1. *Statistics of Authoritarian and Democratic Countries*

Country	Agricultural labor force (%)[a]	GNP per capita[b]	Infant mortality rate[c]	Mailed items per capita[d]	Severity of slump (%)[e]	Peak unemployment rate (%)[f]
1. Democratic						
Australia	25.4	567	53	161	13.4	19.1
Belgium	17.3	1,098	94	179	7.9	19.0
Canada	36.8	1,203	90	96	30.1	19.3
Czechoslovakia	36.9	586	146	76	18.2	17.4
Denmark	35.3	945	81	78	2.9	31.7
Finland	64.6	590	84	29	6.5	(6.2)[g]
France	35.6	982	97	153	11.0	15.4
Ireland	52.1	662	68	67	16.7	
Netherlands	20.6	1,008	52	137	9.1	11.9
New Zealand	33.4		36	215		(10.2)
Norway	35.5	1,033	49	55	8.3	11.3
Sweden	36.0	897	59	88	9.2	23.3
Switzerland	21.3	1,265	54	161	8.0	(4.7)
U.K.	6.0	1,038	69	146	8.1	15.6
U.S.	22.0	1,658	67	227	29.5	22.9
Democratic average	**31.9**	**967**	**73**	**125**	**12.8**	**18.8**
2. Authoritarian						
Austria	29.3	720	120	147	22.5	16.3
Bulgaria	79.8	306	149		8.6	
Estonia	59.0	(95)		51		
Germany	29.0	770	89	94	16.1	30.1
Greece	53.7	390	94	20	8.2	
Hungary	53.0	424	177	41	9.4	30.0[h]
Italy	46.8	517	120	59	6.1	(15.5)
Japan	43.0	(208)	138	60	4.5	(6.8)
Latvia	66.2	(115)		47		
Lithuania	76.7	(69)				
Poland	65.9	350	145	32	22.3	16.7
Portugal	55.0	320	142	23		
Romania	77.2	331	184	21	6.2	
Spain	56.1	445	126	33	20.4	
Yugoslavia	78.1	341	147	35	11.9	
Authoritarian average	**57.9**	**352**	**159**	**48**	**12.4**	

[a] Percent of labor force in agriculture, c. 1930. Czech figure is for 1930 but refers to territory of 1945; Portuguese figure is corrected; Spanish figure is for 1920.

[b] 1929 GNP per capita, expressed in 1960 US$. *Source:* Bairoch 1976: 297; Mitchell 1993; for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from *Latvian Economist*, 1933, estimates for national income, adjusted upward by 15 percent (these figures still seem rather low).

[c] c. 1928 infant mortality rate per 1,000. Note U.S. mortality for black infants alone was 106. *Source:* Mitchell 1993, 1998.

[d] No. of items per inhabitant sent through the mail, c. 1930. *Source:* Mitchell 1993, 1998.

[e] Maximum peak-trough percent fall in GDP during period 1922–35, at constant prices. *Source:* Mitchell 1993, 1995, 1998; Lethbridge 1985: 538, 571, 592. Polish figure estimated.

[f] Highest annual interwar unemployment rate. *Source:* Maddison 1982: 206; Newell and Symons 1988: 70; Toniolo and Piva 1988: 230; Garside 1990: 5; Mitchell 1993, 1995, 1998. These figures are notoriously unreliable. More backward national accounting systems typically produce severely understated unemployment figures. Those I consider too low I have placed in parentheses.

[g] Figures in parentheses are probably unreliable and much too low. They have not been included in calculations of averages.

[h] Industrial work force only.

between countries. Infant mortality is a simpler measure of well-being, collected fairly similarly by governments, though it is very affected by the very poor (who provide most of the mortality).[6] Items sent through the mail measures genuine "discursive" literacy, though it is affected by urbanization, since townspeople write more letters. All these indices have their particularities. It is their combination that matters. More developed countries have higher GNP per capita and more mail, but lower agricultural employment and infant mortality. Were these also the liberal democratic countries?

The table broadly answers "yes": The democracies were more developed by a factor of two or three on these indices.[7] Most democratic countries do better than most authoritarian ones on all four measures, because the northwest of the continent was much more developed than the southeast. There were a few deviant cases, however. All four German and three Austrian statistics reveal that they were developed countries. Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Ireland were economically marginal cases between the two Europes, and they were also somewhat politically marginal. Overall, with the major Germanic exceptions, this is a strong relationship. Whatever qualifications I make later, the rise of authoritarianism was mainly a problem for the less-developed countries of interwar Europe.

Yet the table shows that this cannot be so of fascism. Indeed, some have argued that fascism is not important in very backward countries, since it requires an economy and civil society sufficiently advanced to allow effective mobilization of the masses. The most backward countries, they say, had to rely on old regime organization, such as the monarchy or the military, and so at most could reach only corporatism (Gomez-Navarro 1991). Riley (2002) argues that fascist mass-mobilization presupposed a denser "civil society" – inverting the usual liberal theory of civil society, which sees such density as a precondition for democracy. These writers suggest that fascism developed best in the more developed countries that contained denser networks of markets and voluntary associations. Yet Table 2.1 shows that the largest fascist movements were found at *all* levels of development, including advanced Austria and Germany, middling Italy, and backward Romania and Hungary. Fascism seems unrelated to level of economic development.

"Modernization" and Marxian schools of theory both say that economic development *causes* democratization, with modern social classes as its agents. Drawing on a tradition stretching back to Aristotle, modernization theorists such as Lipset (1960) and Huntington (1991: 66–8) argue that economic development expands the size of the middle class, and this favors democracy. One Marxian writer, Barrington Moore (1966), agreed, arguing that the

bourgeoisie (along with a free peasantry) had pressed for liberal constitutions in early modern Europe. Other Marxian writers, especially Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), have questioned this in more recent times. They show that the middle classes have tended to follow rather than lead democratization, being sometimes pro-, sometimes antidemocratic. They say the working class was the main force for democracy, with large agrarian landlords being the main antidemocrats. Capitalist industrialization thus favored democracy by increasing the size of the working class and reducing the power of agrarian landlords. Stephens (1989) explains interwar authoritarianism mainly in terms of conflict between a democratic working class and capitalists, especially agrarian ones, eventually resorting to authoritarian repression. There is a banal argument involved here: The larger the social group capable of mobilization, the more likely it is to favor enfranchising large numbers. First the middle class demanded the suffrage, then the working class – and this caused some outweighted middle-class groups to backtrack on democracy, as during the 1848 Revolution.

Let me add one point. The political legacies of former times may modify later class behavior. Consider agrarian landlords. In premodern Europe they were politically decisive (as Barrington Moore says), since they ran society. But only in backward regions such as Hungary or Andalucia did they retain much economic power in the interwar period, after industrialization and land reform took their toll. Agrarian landlords played a lesser economic role in Weimar Germany and even less in Romania. Nonetheless, landlords often retained control of state executives, especially officer corps and ministries of the interior. This was because landowners had long ago entrenched their rule amid a broader "old regime": kin-connected monarchies, landowning nobilities, and the elites of bureaucracies, armed forces, and established churches. Mayer has emphasized that old regimes survived into the interwar period, maintaining entrenched political, military, and ideological power while their economic power was fading. We see below that authoritarian rightism and even fascism were more closely related to the decisions made by old regimes than to narrowly defined propertied classes.

Luebbert (1991) emphasizes two other important legacies from the prewar period: the degree to which liberal political parties were already powerful and the degree to which agricultural laborers were already mobilized. He notes that strong liberal political traditions helped wavering classes to maintain a prodemocratic stance, while their absence pushed them into the authoritarian camp. And if agricultural laborers were not already organized, interwar socialist attempts to organize them alienated small peasant proprietors and shifted them rightward (as Heberle 1964 showed in his classic

study of Schleswig-Holstein). I support his first argument and modify his second.

Classes are useful theoretical constructs that we operationalize with empirical indicators. In historical research our indicators are often poor. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries we acquire information on organizations such as trade unions and political parties, plus gross voting trends. Until after 1945 we have virtually no opinion or exit polls, nor have any of the authors cited above attempted ecological studies of voting. They present only gross voting patterns and examine organizations that they assume represent classes: Socialist parties or labor unions tell us about the working class, conservative parties or employers' organizations about the bourgeoisie or landowners, and so on. Yet to equate classes with particular organizations is risky. Few interwar union movements managed to recruit more than a quarter of manual workers, whereas successful conservative parties must often have derived more votes from workers than from any other class (since workers were so numerous). There are many social influences that might cross-cut class – such as economic sector, region, religion, gender, and generation. Through ecological analysis of voting in my case-study chapters, we see that core "proletarian ghettos" – worker families living amid dense worker urban neighbourhoods containing manufacturing industry or mining – usually did support leftist visions of democracy. But most interwar workers lived and worked in other kinds of communities and were drawn toward liberal or conservative visions of democracy and also to nondemocratic authoritarian and especially fascist views. Small peasants also espoused varied politics, some pro-, others antidemocratic, according to complex economic circumstances (not just fear of their laborers, as Luebbert suggests) and tugged also by regional, ethnic, religious, and gender sentiments. In the interwar period capitalist (especially agrarian capitalist) organizations tended to be antidemocratic, while socialist organizations were relatively prodemocratic, but this concerns minorities, not majorities.

Class theory also has difficulty with fascism. Whereas the other forms of authoritarian regime were staffed by conservatives trying to mobilize and control mass movements, fascism was a populist and "radical" movement, with a strong "bottom-up" thrust. Traditional class explanations work better for the most conservative forms of authoritarianism and less well for fascism. Not that class was irrelevant to fascist support. Fascists received disproportionate support from economic sectors liking the message of class transcendence, people from all classes who were working and living outside the main sites of severe class conflict in modern society.

The interwar period also saw the rise of statism. Authoritarian rule had now acquired plausible claims to sponsor social development – for example, to cure unemployment – that earlier absolutism had not aspired to. This might make it more attractive to workers. Thus the rival attractions of liberal democracy or authoritarianism have varied through time, perhaps for sizable groups in all classes, independently of level of development. Interwar Europe distinctively favored authoritarianism, as earlier or later Europe did not. This means that the gross differences that Table 2.1 revealed may have partially reflected the *past* association of capitalist development with democracy. This possibility seems most evident in terms of the changing nature of the middle class, referred to earlier. In the French revolutionary period, capitalism was highly decentralized, its industrial development mainly the work of small entrepreneurs. Its markets were relatively "free" – helping to develop free politics also. By 1918 "organized capitalism" had arrived (to use Hilferding's contemporary term), and much of the middle class was employed and subordinated within authoritative organizations. Perhaps it might be less attracted by "free politics."

This is speculation. But the statistics do show that the *absolute* level of economic development reached in the interwar period cannot explain the rise of authoritarianism. Take the cases of Italy and Spain. Their per capita incomes around 1930 were close to the median level of countries then plunging into authoritarianism. Such an absolute level had been attained only quite recently in the world: by the United States and Britain in the 1850s, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in the 1860s, France and Norway in the 1880s, Denmark in the 1890s, and Sweden in the 1900s (Bairoch 1976: 286, 297).[8] They were the economic equivalents of Italy and Spain in 1930 (though obviously only in gross economic terms). In the late nineteenth century the advance had been toward democracy, not authoritarianism. Yet now Italy and Spain were marching the other way. The same level of economic development accompanied democratization before World War I, but an authoritarian surge after it. The problem remains today, for most countries in the world have reached the level of economic development achieved by Britain in the 1850s or Denmark in the 1890s, yet only a few are genuinely democratic. Through the twentieth century a higher and higher level of per capita income seem "required" in each decade for countries making transitions to democracy (see the statistics presented by Huntington 1991 and Maravall 1997). Other processes of world-historical development must have blocked liberal democracy in the twentieth century. Its economy did not prove particularly favorable to democracy – unlike its wars, which tended to be won by democracies.

"Late development" theory supplies an economic theory of the twentieth century blockage, claiming that the early developers – Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, perhaps France and the United States – had experienced uniquely favorable economic conditions for liberal democracy. Their economies had grown gradually, with decentralized markets and weak states. The first "late developers," especially Germany, nurtured more protectionist and statist models of development. As subsequent economic development became more rapid and dislocating, it generated more class confrontation amid more interventionist states. Peasants dislocated by world markets and laborers flocking into much larger factories and cities were exposed to the new viruses of socialism and anarcho-syndicalism. They confronted a more centralized capitalist class, aided by a more dependent middle class. Class conflict became more destabilizing. Two great "armed camps" confronted one another, in the words of the contemporary writer Carl Schmitt (who is referred to at length below). States now also sought to promote economic growth, seeing themselves as the bearers of a desired developmental project (Janos 1982; Gomez-Navarro 1991). Pressed by proletarians below, bourgeois classes could lean on a stronger state. There was also an international dimension, for the global economy was also more tightly integrated. Latecomers said they were "proletarian nations" exploited by the advanced countries, generating nationalism among the lower and middling classes. Because of these macro-economic tendencies, late economic development might generate extreme nation-statism in an attempt to repress "class enemies" at home and abroad.

This argument appears plausible in the Eastern European periphery. Late development policies figure in Hungarian and Romanian authoritarianism, as detailed in Chapters 7 and 8. Yet neither Germany nor Austria were by now "late" developers: Germany had the most advanced economy in Europe, while Austria, though enormously disrupted by the loss of its Empire, had a fairly open economy. So did Spain and Portugal before Salazar and Franco. And though these two near-corporatist dictators brought more autarchic economies, this was for purposes of not economic development but political control. Indeed, both their corporatist economies stagnated badly. Conversely, late development without much state intervention characterized the democratic Nordic periphery (Bairoch 1976). Nordic growth and industrialization rates, factory sizes, and socialist strength were now higher than those of almost all authoritarian countries. Yet the Nordic countries were deepening their democracies in the interwar period. Pressures that in the center, south, and east seemed to overwhelm their fragile democracies deepened democracy in the northwest. Late economic

development alone cannot explain authoritarianism, though it figured in some places.

One problem is that this scholarly tradition has been fixated on statism, ignoring nationalism. Yet authoritarian movements – and their economic theorists – were mobilizing nationalism as well as statism. As Berend (1998) has argued, protectionism, import-substitution, covert devaluations, and the like, which were prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period, were not just technical economics. They were also importantly nationalist, presupposing certain nationalist beliefs. Rather similar organic nationalist ideologies and movements were becoming important just about everywhere across the east and south of the continent. This was rarer across the older countries of the northwest, even in the late-developing Nordic countries. But it was ubiquitous across former Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman lands. And herein obviously lies the main difference. Most of the democratic countries of the northwest had been independent states for far longer. Whatever sense of "exploitation" they may have had, this could not rest on foreign political domination by Habsburg- or Romanov-type states. Of course, Ireland and Norway differed in this respect. But such differences and exceptions point us to the importance of political and geopolitical power relations, discussed below in the chapter. In contrast to their common political experience the countries of the east and the south experienced far more diverse class conflicts, since these depended far more on the particular economic structure of the country. Moreover, ethnic tensions were also still growing in the early twentieth century, whereas class conflict was older and more institutionalized (though briefly destabilized at the end of World War I). Though both class and national conflict helped generate authoritarianism, we see below that national conflicts were usually more relevant to the projects of fascists. German and Romanian fascists shared more national than class sentiments, as we also see below. Thus long-term economic development and its attendant conflicts were indeed significant causes of the major political conflicts of the period, but they were mediated by nationalism. This is why the most self-conscious development strategies were espoused most enthusiastically by fascists, who combined both.

So relative economic backwardness may help more to explain authoritarianism, but late development strategies may help more to explain fascism. We have not yet fully explained why.

(2) *Economic slump*. Authoritarianism might be a response to short-term economic fluctuations, especially recessions. This seems an obvious explanation, but the data are equivocal. The last two columns of Table 2.1 detail the maximum peak-trough falls in GNP between any two years during

1927 to 1935 and the highest recorded unemployment rate. They reveal no overall difference between liberal democratic and authoritarian countries. The most severely affected by recession were democratic Canada and the United States, followed by authoritarian Austria, Poland, and Spain, then by democratic Czechoslovakia and Ireland, then by authoritarian Germany and democratic Australia. Unemployment rates provide less reliable data. Unfortunately, we cannot calculate real unemployment rates of most of the more backward and authoritarian countries. However, two of the fascist countries, Germany and Austria, did have the highest rates, along with democratic Denmark. But these are hardly convincing evidence of any clear relationship. The problem is that all of the west suffered a slump, but only half of it went authoritarian.

Were authoritarian coups immediately preceded by slumps? Five coups during 1932–34 followed the onset of the Great Depression: in Germany, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria. It is highly plausible that the Depression precipitated them. I examine in more detail the cases of Germany and Austria in Chapters 4–6. Yet even if they confirmed the hypothesis, this would still leave ten or eleven countries whose coups were not a response to the Great Depression, plus the sixteen northwestern countries that did not experience coups at all, yet experienced the Depression. A few coups at other times also directly followed a recession. The Italian recession from 1918 was reversed only in 1922, the year of the fascist coup. Spain and Romania experienced two main authoritarian surges. Spain had Primo de Rivera's coup in 1926 and the military rising of 1936. Yet there had been a modest Spanish boom between 1922 and 1925, a decline in 1932–3, followed by recovery in 1934 and a leveling-off in 1935 – somewhat ambiguous results. In Romania, King Carol took full powers in 1938, after six years of mild economic growth. The main fascist surge in Hungary occurred in the same year, amid slightly improving economic conditions. Poland, Portugal, and Lithuania all had their main coups in 1926, following several years of mild economic growth. Finally, the 1928–9 Yugoslav crisis and the 1935–6 Greek crisis came after several years of economic growth. These are very mixed results, pointing in no single explanatory direction.

There were three distinct surges of authoritarianism, each including at least one fascist coup: in the mid-1920s, during 1932–4, and from the mid-1930s. Though the second surge was at the tail end of the Great Depression and included the most important fascist coup – in Germany – the first and third surges mostly occurred amid stuttering economic growth. All three affected countries big and small and they were scattered through the

center, east, and south of the continent. There was thus no overall relationship between economic cycles and authoritarian surges in the interwar period.

Nowhere was economic growth very vibrant in the interwar period. Industrial economies suffered bankruptcies and mass unemployment, agrarian ones suffered overproduction, falling prices, and indebtedness. Depressed economies generated political crises. Regimes were shaky amid such economic crisis. But the vital policy question was, how to solve economic crisis? The traditional "solution" had been do little, since free markets will recover spontaneously. Thus few conservative, liberal, or labor parties possessed genuine macro-economic policies. Yet "nation-statist" policies were now stirring. Keynesian policies of demand management proposed mildly nation-statist solutions. More universally, tariffs were imposed against foreign imports, coupled with currency devaluations to make one's own exports cheaper. This was economic nationalism. From such policies fascists developed their own autarchic economics. This was not mere technical economics (as if such a beast had ever lived!). Scandinavian economic policy became the most Keynesian yet stayed democratic, while most countries, democratic and authoritarian, slapped on the tariffs. Something more is needed to explain why only some political economies acquired an authoritarian slant. Economic difficulties weakened regimes in *all* interwar countries. In the northwestern countries cabinets and parties split, coalition governments formed and reformed; in the center, south, and east there were coups, surging authoritarianism, and mass fascism. Why the regional difference? We cannot explain it from the performance of the interwar economy alone. Though economic difficulties caused crises and political coups, they do not seem to have been decisive in producing an authoritarian, still less a fascist outcome, rather than a democratic one.

Of course, this discussion might seem too narrow. Why should we expect last year's trade or unemployment figures to generate this year's coup? Political movements take a few years to build up steam. Maybe the general aura of economic crisis in the period is what matters more in weakening regimes and giving authoritarians, including fascists, the chance to air their solutions and get organized. But if the economic crisis and solutions matter most, political elites and voters should say so – another task for my case-study chapters.

(3) *Class conflict*. Did authoritarianism and fascism result from rising class conflict? The two class theories I discuss say yes. "Middle-class theorists" argue that the middle class was worst affected by the period's economic crisis and sought violent means to restore the balance. Little hard evidence has

been presented to support this argument, though periods of inflation tend to hurt the middle class on fixed incomes and salaries more than others. In some countries (e.g., Germany in the late 1920s) this appears to have been a factor in the decline of bourgeois liberalism. Yet it is not clearly connected to the rise of fascism. Nor did many coups occur after periods of rising inflation. No one has empirically demonstrated that labor did relatively better than the middle class in the vital years – though big business did. More detailed future research might accomplish this, though my case studies more often suggest the reverse. And if fascism was not middle-class, then the whole argument would be shot down.

"Capitalist class theorists" say that economic crisis intensified conflict between capital and labor, inducing capital to rely on repression. This is more plausible. Today we suspect from knowledge of the whole twentieth century that the destiny of labor movements was not to destroy capitalism but to reform it. But this was not so clear in the 1920s and 1930s. The Bolshevik Revolution had an immense impact, and many expected further revolutions in advanced countries. Large socialist, communist, and anarcho-syndicalist movements proclaimed allegiance to "revolution." The stronger the left, perhaps the stronger the authoritarian backlash. Is this so? Usually, though not always. In the 1930s liberal democratic France actually had the largest Communist Party, liberal democratic Norway proportionately the largest left-socialist one. But only central, eastern, and southern leftists sometimes assassinated their enemies and hatched real revolutionary plots. If we placed ourselves in the shoes of Spanish latifundistas, threatened by anarcho-syndicalist and socialist land occupations, bombings, and ostensibly "revolutionary" uprisings, we might also reach for the gun.

Yet if we analyze the class violence more closely, reactions become more puzzling. There was far more violence between 1917 and 1919 than later, and more was committed by the political right than by the left. During 1917 and 1918 various insurrections were launched against governments collapsing under the strains of war. Some had prospects of success. However, except for the civil war in Russia, most of the dead were leftists. Hungary had the only other (short-lived) "successful" revolution. There a communist-socialist coup led by Bela Kun seized the government and held it for just over a year, in the process killing 350 to 600 civilians (three-quarters of them peasants engaged in resisting government requisitioning of their produce). In subsequent reprisals a rightist "White Terror" then killed between 1,000 and 5,000 leftists and imprisoned a massive 60,000 (Rothschild 1974: 153; Janos 1982: 202; Mócsy 1983: 157; Vago 1987: 297). Rightist violence was not a mere response to leftist violence; it vastly exceeded it.

A more routine indicator of class conflict and leftist "threat" might be the strike rate or the socialist-communist vote. The strike rate rocketed at war's end but then declined before the main authoritarian upsurge. Italy was different. Italian strikes peaked in 1919–20, clearly helping to fuel the growth of fascism. They then declined greatly, substantially due to fascist pressure. Italy thus offers some support to the theory. Austrian strikes peaked in 1924 and then declined fairly continuously, well before the rightist surge. German strikes peaked in 1920, with a smaller peak in 1924 and a yet smaller one in 1928, but the secular trend remained downward – again, without any authoritarian surge until 1932–3. Portuguese strikes peaked in 1920, though there was a lower peak in 1924, two years before the first military coup. Polish strikes peaked during 1922–3, well before any coup. Estonian strikes did peak again in 1935 (back to the level of 1921–2) but had little apparent impact on the coup the following year. Here the main leftist threat had come in 1924, with a Soviet-backed insurrection. Its crushing, followed by Stalin's purge of its fleeing leaders, removed any internal "Bolshevik" threat to Estonia (Parming 1975). Strikes actually loomed larger in democracies. Britain's great General Strike was in 1926; the French peak was reached under the Popular Front government from 1936. The problem is that strikes are usually a fairly institutionalized form of expressing grievance, geared at extracting concessions from within the system. They rarely aim at revolution. It is perhaps for the same reason that trade union membership levels do not correlate with rightist coups. Except for Spain, unionization peaked in 1918–21 and then declined. Similarly with the communist/socialist vote. This was in fairly general decline from the mid-1920s (though the Austrian socialist vote held up to the end and the German leftist vote did not decline much and some of it switched from socialism to communism in 1932 and 1933). Eastern European unionization and leftist voting was far too low to explain much. There was little threat in the east from the left. Thus the strength of the left might seem relevant only to the early coups – and especially to the fascist coup in Italy. Workers were not threatening enough to provoke a rightist backlash in many places.

Finally, we have one decisive measure of the strength of left and right – their ability to seize power. During 1917–20 the left might reasonably worry conservatives: Russian and Hungarian revolutionaries did seize power, and there were scattered risings elsewhere. But after 1920 the score reads differently: successful rightist coups in sixteen countries and not a single leftist one. The nearest leftists came to success was probably in 1934 when Spanish leftists seized part of the Asturias region, though not its capital, and they held out for only two weeks (see Chapter 9). If communists, socialists,

and anarchists constituted such a serious threat, we would expect at least *one* success, of a month or so. Most rightist coups occurred in the 1930s, simply too *late* to be a realistic response to the threat from the extreme left, then fading rapidly across almost all of Europe (as Eley 1983: 79 has also noted). Of course, some Red scares might have been tactical ploys. Did Hitler believe more in the "Bolshevik threat" or in its electoral utility? Mussolini only pretended to believe in a "communist threat" (see Chapter 3). Metaxas used the "communist threat" as a pretext for his coup in Greece. But the Greek communist party was small and split, and the British Embassy reported home that Metaxas's claim was a smokescreen for a coup that in reality was the result of faction fighting on the right (Kofas 1983: 31–50, 129–45). But someone must have been frightened of a "Red Peril," otherwise Mussolini and Metaxas would not have bothered trying to scare them. It is not clear why, on rational grounds, they would be.

It might alternatively be argued that authoritarians were able to strike precisely *because* of the left's weakness. But if the left was weak, why would the right bother? Why should class interests dictate that the center, east, and south keep moving toward more extreme regimes rather than staying with semi-authoritarian or reactionary ones? We should perhaps not underestimate the role that sheer vindictiveness can play in human conflict. If the left had in the past severely scared the upper classes, then the latter might actually enjoy a chance to crush them cruelly later, when the scare had actually gone. But a question still arises. Why should upper and middle classes increase the level of repression, abolish parliaments and civil liberties, and mobilize mass parties – still less call in dangerous fascists – if tried and tested milder forms were available at lower cost and risk? In fact the best solution to class struggle was visible in the northwest. Its unions, socialist parties, and strikes were larger than in most of the center, east, and south but were implicated in class compromise, posing little threat to capitalist property relations. All its socialist parties first came to power as minority governments or in coalition with center parties, a perfect setting in which to learn the arts of compromise. The center, east, and south's neglect of all this experience appears puzzling.

Nonetheless, worker activity was often perversely described by conservatives as "insurrectionary" or "revolutionary." They were overreacting, fearing revolutions that were not there, reaching for the gun too soon, as Mayer (1981) suggests. Most of the so-called Bolsheviks in Germany denounced by Hitler were actually respectable Social Democrats, ruling with moderation the largest province, Prussia, for over a decade. In Eastern Europe the actual strength of socialists (and the interest shown by Stalin in aiding

them) was pitiful compared with the right's anti-Marxist hysteria. Some class theorists acknowledge this. Corner (1975: 83) says of the Italian bourgeoisie: "Convinced that social revolution was on the way, they became incapable of distinguishing between the real and the imagined situation." If so, we need an explanation that goes beyond "objective" class interest. Explaining such hysterical class overreaction is one of the main puzzles of the period.

Some conclude that authoritarianism, especially fascism, had an irrational strain. Faced with the Nazi Final Solution, this is tempting. But I prefer not to separate quite so clearly the rational from the irrational, for "rational" human calculation always comes entwined with ideology. The problem that the bourgeoisie faced has also bedeviled social theory as well. We still do not have a good explanation of the ferocity of class struggle. Marx himself is partly to blame. Ultimately an economist rather than a sociologist, his masterwork *Das Kapital* is stuffed full not with analyses of class conflict but with rational economic calculations of profit and loss, of shares of the surplus going to capital and labor, and so on. Marx appears to have shared the common illusion that capitalism is driven by the rational pursuit of profit, though he believed it was ultimately nonrational for humanity as a whole.

There are two problems with this. First, much of the behavior discussed in this book is difficult to understand by this purely instrumental criterion. Consider, for example, Spanish capitalists between 1939 and the late 1960s, loyal supporters of General Franco and running a stagnant, inefficient economy, producing little profit. Why did they help General Franco into power, and then loyally support him? They would have been much better off with the Second Republic (as they are now with the third one). They seemed driven by a more basic capitalist motive – or rather a motive shared by all the possessing classes of history – to keep their property and privileges. To hell with profit, if property itself seems threatened. Profit is inherently quantitative, divisible, and compromisable, and indeed cooperation between the classes usually increases profits. Yet property rights are finite and zero-sum. If I give you any rights to my property, I lose them. Resistance to potential loss of property will be much more intense and emotional than resistance to potential loss of profit. We can figure out a compromise solution to share profits, but we will fight near to the death to protect our property. Marxists would do better if they did not actually take bourgeois economics so seriously. In this book it is less profit than property defense that dominates capitalist class motivations.

Yet neither of these motives comes on its own, as a rational calculation disembodied from ideology. The pursuit of individual profit is accompanied by a theory of an efficient economy and by a morality of individual freedom

and rationality. These theories and morals are not static, and they have changed during our century. But in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they were usually accompanied by two notions: that collective organization was an infringement of liberty and that only the educated and refined man (i.e., not a woman) was capable of such rational calculation. Thus capitalists hated trade unions as an infringement on their fundamental freedoms and as irrational blockages to an efficient economy. They also believed that unions would reduce their profits, but this was often not the driving force of their resistance, since the belief was incorrect and was shown to be incorrect where unions were recognized as legitimate. However, this is not the primary source of capitalist hatred and resistance in the countries studied here. It dominated in the United States, not Germany, inspiring the most ferocious and malignant persecution of labor unions of any turn-of-the-century country (see Mann 1993: 638–59). It is still not dead in the United States, inspiring genuine hatred of "Reds" supposedly lurking in any left-of-center organization.

But it was the ideological substratum of the second motive, defense of property rights, that mattered more in the rise of authoritarian regimes. For property was associated in the ideology of the time with two fundamental desirable social values: order and security. The triad of property, order, and security, divinely ordained, was the ideological soul of the old regime. The new authoritarianism began to lay more stress on the order and security part of the formula, and fascism took this even further. There were now two alternative threats that the modern left and the Bolshevik Revolution had supposedly brought. One was the traditional threat to the upper class of having its property and privileges seized. The second was the threat to all classes not of a "successful" revolution but of disorder, class conflict without end. The first was a fundamental threat at the jugular vein of the capitalist class, but the second was a threat to civilized order itself, threatening everyone's security. Genuine hatred and malignity may result from the perception of such threatening enemies.

I have not yet solved the problem of "hysterical overreaction." I have suggested that some fairly basic human sentiments of fear, hatred, and violence might be invoked at the class level in the period immediately after World War I. But why were they not then allayed as the objective threat receded? This was perhaps because of other basic human sentiments, not to forgive but to kick our enemy when he or she is down, especially after he or she has scared us. But it may also be because of the role that ideology plays in defining "interests" more broadly than rational-choice theory suggests. If property is equated with order and security, then they – in the form

perhaps of increasing militarism or paramilitarism – might become positive values for classes fearing a threat to property. And if disorder is feared, then possible antidotes – nationalism, statism, and class transcendence – might also become positive values. Indeed, this is exactly what we shall find. The right in one-half of Europe also became attracted to nationalism, statism, and militarism as values in themselves, and these often prevented those on the right who were propertied from accurately calculating their rate of profit or even their likelihood of retaining their property. These values led them to a more enthusiastic embrace of authoritarianism and often of fascism than mere class interest could explain. But to fully appreciate this will involve us in also considering the military, political, and ideological crises of the period.

In view of all this, the most ambitious type of economic explanation could be only a partial, not a total, explanation, and it would have to be a compound drawn from all these approaches. Economic backwardness might favor semi-authoritarian regimes. Late development might destabilize class relations and provide more statist models. Conservative fears of destabilization coupled with more statist ideals might push them further right, toward repression. But neither Germany nor Scandinavia would fit well, and we still have no good explanation of fascism. Though economic and class theories take us part of the way, we need also to investigate the other sources of social power.

MILITARY POWER, MILITARY CRISIS

Military power is the social organization of physical violence. It is universal in human societies because of the need of human groups for organized defense and the ubiquitous utility of aggression. Those who command military resources may acquire social power more generally. Conversely, when dominant military institutions decay, this opens up new opportunities for others, including other armed groups, to seize power. However, either eventuality also presupposes that "militarism" enjoys some positive ideological valuation in society, and specifically that military organization seems to offer legitimate models for power acquisition and rule. In principle, all well-organized militaries could seize power, but only a few actually do so.

Military power has been neglected by social science. Though the early twentieth century produced a flurry of social theories of military power relations, they tended to vanish after 1945 – ironically, with the defeat of fascism. Since then we have had the curious spectacle of a modern age dominated by wars, conquest, and genocide interpreted by pacific, economistic

theories. Even when theorists have turned to consider military power relations, they have tended to focus exclusively on the highly institutionalized force mobilized by states, in domestic repression and interstate wars. As we see below, an exclusive focus on violence organized by states could not explain the rise of fascism.

Yet recent historical sociology has unearthed a set of long-term military and geopolitical causes of the division of Europe into constitutional and absolutist regimes that parallel the economic causes identified by Barrington Moore. Myself (Mann 1986, 1993) Tilly (1990), and Downing (1992) have argued that (1) struggles over political representation resulted from the state's need to tax more in order to fight more expensive foreign wars, (2) those wars became increasingly fought by professional armies under the control of the state, who could potentially be used for domestic repression to extract more taxes, but (3) states that could raise funds either from foreign trade or from taxing conquered foreigners did not need to turn up the repressive screws in order to get higher taxes, and (4) naval powers could not turn up the repression as much as land powers, since navies cannot sail on dry land. To explain Europe's division into constitutional and absolutist regimes through the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries would require blending economic, military, and geopolitical causes – and perhaps other causes, too. It is also probable that military and geopolitical causes would continue to play a part in the further development of the "two Europes."

Moreover, explanations of fascism do generally recognize that military power relations had just been revolutionized. World War I had deepened citizen warfare into "total war." Most writers accept that fascism would never have triumphed without the emergence of such a catastrophic form of warfare. The capacity to mobilize millions of men to fight and many more millions of men and women to provide economic and logistical support to the armed forces brought many social changes. In the short term it enormously increased the infrastructural, and to a lesser extent the despotic, powers of most states. It is also a truism that victory in war brings more regime legitimacy, while defeat brings the reverse. Total war might seem to strengthen this argument – especially for defeat, which now becomes a social catastrophe. But modern total war had also introduced a series of tensions between state power and mass military citizenship that in the circumstances of possible or actual defeat could radically destabilize states. The initial conflicts erupted in 1917 and 1918 with a series of soldiers' and sailors' mutinies and insurrections in most of the combatant armies. These peaked in the February and October Revolutions in Russia. Here soldiers formed many of the revolutionary councils (soviets), and their hastily assembled Red Army then

successfully defended the Revolution through a full-scale civil war. Austria, Germany, and Hungary also saw insurrectionary soldiers' soviets, though these were soon repressed. But the repression was less often by the state's official armed forces than by the doppelganger of the soldiers' soviets, rightist paramilitaries. Such "popular" militarism from below was to provide the core of fascist movements everywhere.

Fascism became a mass movement only at the end of the Great War. Most European states were participants, but even the neutrals were deeply affected. The war obviously intensified nationalism and statism. But there were also three direct military links to fascism. First, the war tended to delegitimate defeated regimes, which had tended to be only semi-authoritarian. Many have thus argued that defeat in World War I was quite likely to produce more authoritarian and fascist outcomes – though the immediate impact was actually the reverse, to increase democratic pressures. This might be plausible for Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the main losers (apart from Russia), all falling to reactionary authoritarians, then corporatists and fascists. The war cost Germany 10 percent of its territories and enormous reparations payments; Hungary lost over half its territories; and Austria lost its entire empire. Rightists in these countries claimed that defeat resulted from a "stab in the back" by civilian politicians, leftists, and sinister "Judeo-Bolsheviks." Spearheaded by refugees flooding in from the lost territories, they demanded the restoration of those territories. Bulgaria was a loser on a lesser scale. Italy is sometimes added to the list of the defeated. Though actually on the winning side, her armies had taken a battering and her territorial gains were fewer than nationalists desired. A "mutilated victory" was blamed on "decadent" liberal governments and "unpatriotic" leftists (De Grand, 1978: 102–14). Since these countries included the main fascist cases (though not Romania), to link military defeat, revisionism, and fascism seems plausible.

Timing remains a problem. Only Italian fascists (1922) and Bulgarian reactionary authoritarians (1923) took power soon after the war, and these countries had suffered the fewest losses. Germany had time to recover. Reparations were settled in 1930, and the Allied occupation of the Rhineland was known to be temporary. Hitler's coup in 1933 was surely too late to be directly attributed to defeat in the First World War. Hungarian politicians knew their revisionism was rhetorical not practical; Austrians knew they could not restore the empire. Defeat could not easily explain enduring authoritarianism or the fascist surge during the 1930s. War defeat did not directly produce fascism. Yet it might have contributed to the first postwar rightist surge, undermining the immediate prospects for democracy, and this might have provided militants for later.

Authoritarianism also triumphed in countries with different war records. Serbia and Romania were victors. Serbia had been rewarded with dominion over Yugoslavia. Romania had its territories and population doubled by the war. These two victors turned authoritarian, and Romania generated mass fascism. Two neutrals – Portugal and Spain – also turned authoritarian. Portugal was not involved in serious warfare in the period. The Spanish Empire had been destroyed by the United States in 1898–9 and a Spanish army was routed by Moroccans in 1921. Yet the blame for these disasters was traded equally between left and right politicians, the monarch and the army itself. Few Spaniards supported imperial revisionism. Nor did many Greeks, after their defeat by Turkey in 1922. Not until 1936 did General Metaxas stage his coup, and foreign policy issues were marginal to it. Finally, the new "successor states" owed their very existence to World War I. Poland, the Baltic states, and Albania also went authoritarian, but most of their postwar leaders were considered heroes of national liberation. Authoritarianism and, to a lesser extent, fascism were thus associated with varied war experiences, not just defeat.

Yet war had a second big impact on a broader area of Europe. Throughout the center, east, and south victors, vanquished and successor states had experienced severe war *dislocation*. Vanquished regimes lost legitimacy, territories, and resources, and some were pressured by refugees. Greece (neutral during 1914–18) experienced much of this after 1922. Italy had only a little dislocation, over Trieste and the South Tyrol. The two clear-cut victors, Romania and Serbia, had to cope with a different yet parallel problem: incorporating extensive new territories that transformed country and state. Serbs had to institutionalize politics that would ensure their own dominance yet leave the other ethnicities in the new Yugoslavia not too unhappy. Romanians now had an enlarged, overwhelmingly rural country, and were no longer quite the oppressed "proletarian nation" of the region. Old states in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Italy were suddenly required to deepen parliamentarism. The brand-new "successor states" had to be started almost from scratch – none shared the opportunity of Finns and Czechs to build on past regional administrations and parliaments. This amounted to considerable war-induced political dislocation over virtually the entire center, east, and southeast. Only neutral Spain and Portugal escaped this.

The northwest had the opposite experience. All but three northwestern countries were victors or neutrals. The two most marginal liberal democracies, Finland and Czechoslovakia, were also the only new successor states. Belgium was the only quasi-defeated state (it was occupied by the German

army), but Belgians sensibly blamed geography, not their politicians. Belgium also received small territorial gains and reparations in the Peace Treaties. Amid the victors (France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), only France received territorial gains, and Alsace-Lorraine had been French before 1871. Nor were their constitutions meddled with. Most were old states. Even the Czechs and Finns had possessed old, hitherto "regional" political institutions, though the Czechs had no tried institutions for ruling Slovaks or Sudeten Germans (this is where their state was later to break down). But virtually none of the northwest had to cope with defeat, incorporate new territories, or devise new constitutions. Thus the center, east, and southeast but almost none of the northwest was witnessing a war-induced dislocation of *political* institutions. But why would destabilization come from the right and lead to authoritarianism and fascism? I turn to the third legacy of the war, paramilitarism.

Prewar fascist theory was influenced by the realization that warfare could now mobilize the whole nation. World War I made this reality. "The nation in arms" proved to be disciplined yet comradely, elitist yet peculiarly egalitarian – since officers and men now fought alongside each other and officers actually suffered the higher casualties. "Total" war conscripted between 25 percent and 80 percent of young and early middle-aged males. But since mass citizen warfare produced mostly horror for the troops, by 1918 most wanted only to get out as quickly as possible, back to jobs and families. A leftist minority took disillusion further, to demand a juster and more pacific society. After a spurt of "workers and soldiers" movements, they became absorbed into civilian left movements. Though some of these did develop uniformed, marching, demonstrating formations conventionally called "paramilitaries," they were much less violent than fascist ones, and they generally lost street battles with them. Leftist veterans had no veneration of militarism and soon lost their distinctive identity as veterans. It was different for a rightist veteran minority. They idealized the disciplined cross-class comradeship of the front and became disenchanted with postwar strife-torn civilian democracy. By extolling military virtues and by continuing certain military practices in peacetime, they devised a distinctive social movement: the citizen paramilitary.

Rightist paramilitaries and organized veterans' leagues assumed significance in most countries. They won a civil war in Finland, repressed the leftist government of Hungary in 1919–20, repressed leftist and foreign opponents in early postwar Germany, Austria, and Poland, overthrew civilian government in Bulgaria in 1923, and almost overthrew the Estonian government

in 1934. They were the core of the first wave of all fascist movements. All fascist and some corporatist and reactionary authoritarian movements maintained substantial paramilitaries in which veterans played the core leadership role. Most theories of the modern state follow Max Weber in defining it as possessing the monopoly of the means of violence in society. Yet this has by no means always been true. That is why we must analytically separate military from political power relations even in the modern state. Military power is not only mobilized by states. Though all interwar regimes possessed quite imposing armies, well trained, well armed, experienced in war, some of these armies were largely immobilized by ideological divisions within. Ideologies, especially rightist ones, were sweeping through all ranks, often sponsored by respected military veterans – even the Supreme Commander, General Ludendorff. Armies were losing much of their caste-like professional autonomy. Some states now had arms of clay and divided hearts.

One view of the link between war veterans and fascism focuses on the link between military and economic power, that is, on veterans' resentment at their material deprivation. The second view focuses on the link between military and ideological power, that is, on the rise of paramilitary values. The economic argument suggests that a veteran cohort centering on the lower middle class (including small peasants) was pushed toward extremism by postwar unemployment and economic deprivation. The paramilitary values argument suggests it was their wartime experience of the front, of classless comradeship and hierarchical subordination. Paramilitary organization, veterans believed, could now achieve great social and political purposes, as military organization had in the war. Though rightist veterans were probably no more numerous than leftist veterans, they maintained a distinctive postwar presence, encouraging them toward the violent cleansing of "enemies" of the nation and toward "knocking heads together" to cure social conflict. My case-study chapters evaluate these two rival explanations. The ideological argument will do better.

Wartime dislocation, and defeat in some of the major cases, provided much of the initial political crisis for the new regimes and could have been vital in stemming the initial surge toward democracy. A particular cohort's exposure to military organization and values then provided a core of militants and a plausible paramilitary solution to this crisis. But this is not a sufficient explanation. Once again, it was only in one-half of Europe that significant paramilitarism surfaced, while both halves of Europe (and other countries, too) had experienced the war. It is true that some stirrings of paramilitarism and even protofascist activity among veterans appeared in almost all the

combatant countries. They were quite pronounced in democratic France. They were small in Britain yet influential in Mosley's British Union of Fascists. In the United States, Campbell (1998) has shown that the newly formed American Legion was used by rightists as a strike- and "Red"-busting organization in the 1920s. Yet compared with veteran fascism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, or Romania, these were minor skirmishes. Perhaps victory versus defeat offers part of the explanation for the difference (though not for Romania). But it does also seem that other circumstances beyond war and its effects must also have contributed to the interwar dominance of authoritarianism and fascism.

POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL CRISIS

Political power derives from control of the state, and ultimately from the usefulness to human groups of territorial and centralized regulation of social relations. Clearly, those who control the state can exercise more general power. The interwar period saw many political crises and coups as factions jockeyed for control of states. This is the stuff of "elite theories" of political power, which contend with two reductionist theories of state, class theory and pluralism. But regardless of the degree of autonomous power wielded by state elites, the institutions and the crises of states may have an autonomous influence over political outcomes. The fact that the French state is highly centralized and the American one decentralized has a continuing legacy on contemporary politics, an example of what I have called "institutional statist theory" (Mann 1993: chap. 3). The "new institutionalism" has also emphasized the enduring impact of existing institutions in structuring social life. In the interwar period we find semi-authoritarian states, long institutionalized but now supposedly making a transition toward democracy experiencing their own crises, with important consequences for fascism.

The main problem of explaining authoritarianism in terms only of the effects of World War I and interwar economic crises is that politics in "the two Europes" had already differed over a much longer period of time. Most of the northwest had made their transition to the liberal democratic nation-state through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In contrast, the whole of the center, east, and south was only now embarking, more suddenly, on this transition amid a rising tide of nationalism and statism. Economic backwardness was important in bringing about this difference, and so were military and geopolitical contexts. But there were also specifically political problems in the center, east, and south. These were states in transition, and they had difficulty coping with interwar crises.

I distinguish two main facets of liberal democracy, what Dahl (1977) terms "participation" and "contestation." "Participation" means the extent of participation in government, centering on who could vote. This has dominated discussion of democratic development (Rokkan 1970: part II; Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 83–98). But "contestation" (or competition) is equally necessary for liberal democracy. Contestation means that sovereign power is contested between parties in free elections, and the executive power cannot override elections.

"Participation" does not clearly distinguish between "the two Europes" in the immediate prewar period. Among the early cases of manhood suffrage were Portugal in 1822, Bulgaria in 1879, and Serbia in 1889, and it had been introduced in France and Germany to bolster the rule of semi-authoritarian Napoleon III and the Kaiser. Late nineteenth-century men might often have the vote, but they were still often controlled by local notables, *caciques*, whose powers as employers, magistrates, charity-dispensers, and tax-gatherers could not be lightly challenged (though the new secret ballot helped). Though by 1914 most franchises were broader in the northwest, both regions contained variation, and this grew greater after 1918. In the 1920s all adult women could vote in Germany and Austria yet none could in France, while single British women aged between twenty-one and thirty could vote only in 1929. The breadth of suffrage could not predict whether liberal democracy survived, though sudden jumps in the suffrage in countries such as Italy and Spain did alarm conservatives, leading some to embrace authoritarianism. Again, political dislocation seems important.

"Contestation" (or competition) predicts better. By the 1880s, mostly decades before, countries in the entire northwest (including their white colonial offshoots) had competitive party systems, largely free elections, and parties that alternated in government with little executive interference. In the Nordic countries, estate assemblies had survived even through absolutist periods. Even in northwestern "colonies," in Ireland and Norway, locals had sent elected representatives to the colonial power's assembly in London and Copenhagen. Even the two marginal cases, Finland and Czechoslovakia, had been permitted provincial assemblies by their Russian and Austrian overlords. Northwestern parliaments also enjoyed powers distinct from those of the majority party, so that a ruling party could not easily remain in government by manipulating office patronage or repression. The paradigm cases were the United States (free party contest among most white males from the 1790s) and Britain (free party contest among 15 to 20 percent of men from 1832). Most of the northwest followed suit during the nineteenth century.

True, royal prerogatives in the choice of ministers survived in Sweden and Denmark, though they were rarely exercised and were finally laid to rest in 1917 and 1920.

This criterion does seem to distinguish virtually perfectly between the two Europes. Obviously, this had much to do with level of development, with the class politics of an earlier age, but also with fiscal-military differences (Mann 1986; Downing 1992). Whatever the exact mix of original causes, their legacy was considerable differences between the nature and stability of political regimes in the early twentieth century, and these now emerged to have their own causal impact on outcomes.

Thus by World War I sovereign parliaments were institutionalized across the northwest.[9] When the suffrage was extended across classes and religions and to women, parties adapted entrenched liberal practices (Luebbert 1991). Interwar discontents were expressed through these representative institutions (see the articles in Schmitt 1988). Only Finland and Czechoslovakia had to find new institutions – and so both struggled. The northwestern state was *unitary*, dominated by institutionalized parliamentary sovereignty, experienced in handling conflict between classes, religious communities, and regions. Belgium and Switzerland were uniquely experienced in coping with ethnic differences. What mattered was less liberal ideology than institutions whose everyday practices embodied liberalism.

Consider late nineteenth-century British miners. Probably few believed in "liberalism." They were as radical (and as well organized) as miners in most countries. But enough of them possessed the vote under the property franchise, and they were sufficiently concentrated in certain parliamentary constituencies, to constitute a voting bloc that the existing parties could not ignore. The Liberal Party responded and represented their grievances in parliament, so miners voted Liberal. This arrangements contained tensions, and miners' MPs acquired some autonomy as "Lib-Labs." In the early twentieth century they joined the Labour Party. Their trajectory was dominated by opportunities created by the essential pragmatism of everyday electoral and parliamentary politics much more than by ideology. In comparable ways the new class and other tensions of the interwar period could be filtered through institutionalized parliamentary states, in the process deepening and strengthening them. Such democratic political traditions were simply too institutionalized to allow fascist, Bolshevist, or any other ideology to develop far. In these countries it may even be inappropriate to refer to liberalism as an ideology. It was only so in the residual sense of an "institutionalized ideology," that is, one embedded in mundane ritual practices. It saw values

and norms instrumentally, relevant to winning the next election or keeping party factions moderately contented.

As Linz (1976: 4–8) noted, fascist parties were latecomers to parliamentary institutions. If party competition already dominated the state, there was little space left for them. Whatever World War I or capitalism might throw at Norway, Sweden, or Denmark, for example, their democratic parties would cope (Hagtvet 1980: 715, 735–8; Myklebust and Hagtvet 1980: 639–44). If their electoral antennae detect rising nationalism, then conservative parties might offer a bit more of it. If they detect statist sentiments, center-left parties will oblige. So later, when some of these countries were occupied by the Nazis and their party systems were destroyed, things might rapidly change. The Nazis found plenty of willing ideological collaborators once they emasculated parliaments and elections. In Norway, for example, they received the support of 55,000 local national socialist collaborators.

In the center, east, and south of Europe, things differed. Parliaments had either barely existed before 1914 (as in the Russian or Ottoman Empires) or shared political power with a nonelected executive, a monarch, military commanders, or a ministerial regime commanding substantial office patronage. The state was *dual*, its "two states" (parliament and executive) each enjoying partial sovereignty (Newman 1970: 225–6). That is the meaning of the term "semi-authoritarian." A legacy of the earlier absolutist period was that the armed forces were more specifically under the control of the executive than they were in the other half of Europe. The monarch could manipulate elections and parliaments by selective repression plus office patronage in the German and Habsburg Empires, Serbia, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria. In Restoration Spain and (to a lesser extent) in "liberal" Italy up to 1919, the Ministry of the Interior or Prime Minister helped fix elections to produce compliant oligarchical governments (*el turno* in Spain, *trasformismo* in Italy). In 1901 half of the Italian deputies were actually government officeholders, hardly "independent" men. "Place holders" had been eliminated in Britain in 1832. But in this half of Europe democratic constitutions were partially undermined by executive powers. Here miners were essentially outside political institutions. Notables might continue to "represent" them rather indirectly through political clientelism. But if this faltered, the notables could have recourse to much greater powers of repression than had their counterparts in the northwest. They had authoritarian, despotic options.

In 1918 the center, east, and south was thus confronted by what we might call "*political* late development." Larsen (1998; cf. Griffin 2001: 49) says that

the Axis states were "late nationbuilders, late liberalizers and introduced democratic rule only a short period before they broke down," but this was also more generally true right across their half of the continent. Germany and Austria moved suddenly to advanced parliamentary sovereignty and full adult suffrage, as Spain did in 1931. Italy had made its first dramatic suffrage extension just before the war, in 1912, and its second in 1918. These major shifts in the parliamentary side of the state were not accompanied by comparable changes within the executive, which (as we see below in the case-study chapters) remained dominated by "old regime" elements that controlled most of the repressive apparatuses of the state. Dual states, supposedly in the process of liberalizing, were found just about everywhere else. But many central, eastern, and southern countries were confronted by a further transitional problem, for they were also founding nation-states. Here the problems were novel and unlike those earlier experienced in the northwest. Northwestern "ethnic blindness"[10] would not do for those inhabiting the former territories or neighborhood of the multinational Russian, Austrian, or Ottoman Empires – now representation was not just of class but also of nationality. Political movements seeking to mobilize national identities and interests appeared alongside movements mobilizing classes. There were old imperial nations (Russian, German, and Ottoman), more recent imperialists (Magyar), "proletarian" nations (Ukrainian, Romanian), newer subimperial nations (Serb, Czech), and minorities of all these in the majority states of other nations. Where nationalities also differed in their religions, this reinforced their sense of mutual unease.

National conflicts were also more directly linked to international conflicts than were class conflicts. The Versailles and Trianon Treaties involved much redrawing of boundaries according to two conflicting principles. One was to punish the losers and reward the winners. The other was to establish "national self-determination," redrawing boundaries according to patterns of ethnic settlement, so that each new state would be predominantly monoethnic. The result was to leave some dissatisfied states with "irredentist" demands for the restoration of "lost territories" coming especially from refugees fleeing from the boundary drawing. We see how demanding and complex were the claims now being made on the dual nation-states of the center, east, and south, and how untried were the political practices for coping with them. Actors were faced with considerable uncertainty and risk, largely absent in the northwest. It was safer perhaps for those who controlled the executive part of the state to repress if faced with crisis. Remember also that this criterion puts the formerly absolutist states of Germany and

Austria in the same position as the less developed states to the east and south.

Let us look at this political crisis of transition through the eyes of the most sophisticated conservative state theorist of the time.[11] Carl Schmitt was a famous German jurist who ended up as an apologist for Nazism after Hitler's accession to power. But in the 1920s he was just a conservative, not wholly committed to any particular type of regime, admiring Mussolini but not Hitler, searching desperately to ground a theory of contemporary constitutional order on a juridical bedrock of absolute legal principle. He wanted certainty, not risk. He believed that certainty was now lacking across continental Europe because the decline of the old semi-authoritarian regime had undermined two essential attributes of constitutional law. First, old regime parliaments had expressed the Enlightenment principle of reason in the form of free debate between rational, independent, educated men. That the best laws were the product of rational discourse between educated men was the essence of nineteenth-century continental liberalism. Now, Schmitt argued, the mass suffrage ("participation" in Dahl's sense) produced the rise of mass parties, and these threatened the independence of these men. Deputies were transformed into mere "representatives" of entrenched interests in society, instructed by their organizations and ideologies how to vote. Free, rational debate was at an end. In fact, he painted an even gloomier scenario of bureaucratically organized, corporatist, "mass armies" (thinking primarily of organized labor, but also occasionally mentioning economic concentration and big business) "invading" and subordinating the state to highly moralistic ideologies of hatred that ultimately failed to conceal their basis in narrow class interests. Perhaps compromise between these interests remained possible, but it would now have to be effected through these organizations themselves, not through parliament. For this, Schmitt correctly noted, was how the Weimar Republic had actually been founded – through an explicit, somewhat insecure "class truce" negotiated between the socialist unions and big businessmen. The participants were not bound together by the normative solidarity of parliament as an assembly of gentlemen. Nor, I would add, were they bound into long-hallowed everyday practices of parties and parliaments. Could they be trusted? Could they trust each other? Schmitt doubted it.

Second, Schmitt argued, domination by political parties (i.e., full "contestation") ended all possibility that the traditional state might continue as the ultimate, neutral guarantor of order and compromise, as it had been in the past. Though we tend to view old regime executives as having been

class-biased, favoring the propertied classes, this is not how conservatives themselves viewed them. The monarch and state had been "above" society, Schmitt argued, providing the ultimate constitutional guarantee against encroaching private interests. A party could represent only a "part" of the nation. It could not replace the state as a "universal" power. Schmitt believed, with some justification, that German state elites were now paralyzed. Yet the pluralism of party competition that replaced them was only one step away from a condition of civil war where there would be no judge to determine what is "mine and thine." The unravelling of competition into "war" was a definite risk. If neither the debating chamber nor the old regime executive could provide order, perhaps a new state executive could provide this. And so through the 1920s Schmitt began to formulate the idea that a new type of ruling elite, above society, was necessary to occupy the "vacated" centers of state power and avoid the risk of disorder. This led him through support for the semi-authoritarianism of Bruning and von Papen to Hitler and Nazism.

Schmitt was articulating very widespread fears. His first argument appealed especially to old regime liberals, his second to conservatives. Of course, there was a great deal of class consciousness lying behind these fears. One particular "mass army" loomed largest for Schmitt, as for other conservatives and liberals – workers' unions and their attendant socialist parties. The shadow of the Bolshevik Revolution loomed behind their worst fears. Yet Schmitt based his theory not on property rights but on a broader notion of order and security. He embodies perfectly what I noted earlier when dealing with the fears of the propertied classes: Property fears are displaced onto a positive concern with order and security. His stress on the threat posed by large bureaucratic and corporate organizations to free rational discourse had and still has broader appeal. It is, for example, quite similar to Habermas's more recent theory of distorted communication, a theory that has a decidedly leftist pedigree. Schmitt even looked favorably on welfare benefits, unless they involved society's "encroachment" on the state. His primary worries were about the state and social order, not class and material interests. Nor did he or his circle have much to do with capitalism. His own family origins were poor, his father being a menial railway employee. The family was strongly Catholic and Schmitt's early conservatism took Catholic forms (i.e., until he broke with the church over his own divorce). He then spent his life in German universities as a professor with secure civil servant status. He mixed in cafe and salon society, meeting artists, writers, and other academics. His writings made him famous among jurists and civil servants, and his connections to power elites were primarily with top civil servants.

He was central to the "humanistic bourgeoisie" and to German statism, but not to capitalism. Though his own nationalism was not extreme, and he was no militarist, his geopolitical writings exposed a contemporary international order biased toward the interests of the victors of World War I. Thus he helped legitimate German imperial revisionism. As we see below, fascism's appeal to the upper classes was not merely based on property interests. It was mediated by concerns with order and security to arrive at a transcendent nation-statism.

And so the fears of many conservatives and some liberals were brought into the same ideological ballpark as that of fascists. A crisis of political transition amid a mass society had disrupted prior sources of constitutional order and security. Things were getting risky, and they might unravel further – amid rising nationalism, statism, and militarism. It was better to be safe than sorry. Since conservatives had ready access to repression in the dual state, they could – to use a football expression – "get their retaliation in first" (while shouting "foul"). This was the rationality lying behind apparent paranoia about the Red Peril. They did not realize that the Black Peril of fascism might be even more threatening.

Thus authoritarianism resulted directly from a political crisis, making it more difficult for some states to cope with the crises emanating from capitalism and militarism. Dual states in the south, east, and center (for I have included the German states) could not be guaranteed to handle crisis safely, except by repression. Whatever crises world war and capitalism threw at the northwest, its liberal states survived. Eugen Weber says, "Twentieth-century fascism is a byproduct of disintegrating liberal democracy" (1964: 139). But this is not quite correct. Institutionalized liberal states successfully rode out the crisis. We should rephrase his statement: Fascism reflected a crisis of the dual state, the "semi-authoritarian, semi-liberal" state found across one-half of Europe, faced with simultaneous transitions to liberal democracy and the nation-state just as these countries were beset by economic and military crises. This produced uncertainty, a downward spiral, and a reaction within the state itself against liberalism: a revolt by one-half of the state against the other, each mobilizing core constituencies of support. We must analyze state elites and parties as carefully as social classes. The lightning rod of this crisis was not liberalism but conservatism. It was the success of northwestern conservatives in moving from notable to mass representative parties that ensured the survival there of liberal states. Elsewhere it was the failure of conservatives to effect this transition that produced authoritarianism and opened the door to fascism. Though the political crisis owed much to long-term processes of economic and geopolitical/military development,

and something to short-term economic and military crises, it also had more specifically political causes. And in turn the political crisis generated a need for real ideologies.

IDEOLOGICAL POWER, IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS

Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning, to share norms, values, and rituals that seem to make sense of the world and that reinforce social cooperation. An ideology mobilizing plausible norms, values, and rituals may also confer power on its initiators. Human existence does not "make its own sense." We draw on more general meaning systems that are not directly "testable" either by science or by our own practical experience. Meaning systems "surpass experience" and so help to define interests. Yet socialization plus the institutionalized routines of education, employment, politics, and so on normally insulate us from needing frequent recourse to general ideologies. Institutions in which we are implicated generate everyday routines that "work" and seem "normal," and they generate minimal "institutionalized ideologies" in which values are routinely undercut by pragmatism. In times of crisis, however, traditional routines and pragmatism may no longer seem to work and we are thrown onto more general ideas in order to find new workable practices. Then intellectuals may offer new meaning systems and so acquire a more general social power. We may then find them plausible, and follow them. This was how I interpreted the rise of the world salvation religions in the first volume of *The Sources of Social Power* (Mann 1986: chap. 10), and how I interpreted the influence of the Enlightenment movement on the French Revolution in volume 2 (Mann 1993: chaps. 6 and 7). Was fascism similar? I investigate fascist communications networks. Geographically, I identify three main networks: transnational networks, macro-regional networks that might help construct or reinforce "the two Europes," and networks confined within nation-states. Socially, I identify core ideological constituencies of fascism.

Fascism was obviously very ideological. Other authoritarian rightists did not live much at the ideological level. They would pragmatically steal as much fascist clothing as was compatible with staying in power, while seeking to defuse fascism's radical, bottom-up thrust. But the prewar progenitors of fascism had been intellectuals, and intellectuals always remained important in fascism. In the prewar period Maurras, Barrès, Sorel, and race theorists such as Chamberlain and Gobineau, plus a host of middlebrow journalists, popularizers, and pamphleteers – right down to the infamous anti-Semitic forgery *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* – had far more readers than prewar

fascist or racist political organizations had members. All fascist movements continued to appeal disproportionately to the well educated – to students in high schools and universities and to the most highly educated middle-class strata. Salvatorelli (1923) described this core constituency as the "humanistic bourgeoisie." Though fascism attracted really major intellectuals only in Italy and Romania, everywhere it attracted minor ones, especially communications specialists in newspapers, radio, film, and graphic design. Fascism was a movement of the lesser intelligentsia.

And so fascist programs were formed amid a broader ideology. I quoted Codreanu's contemptuous dismissal of the typical "shopping list" of party programs. Fascists situated interest-based economics or politics amid a *Weltanschauung* (a general orientation to the world). They claimed a higher moral purpose, transcendent of class conflict, capable of "resacralizing" a modern society grown materialistic and decadent. They identified a "civilizational crisis" encompassing government, morality, science, social science, the arts, and "style." They denounced their enemies in moralistic and highly emotional terms. Socialists brought "Asiatic barbarism," liberals were "decadent" and "corrupt." Science was "materialistic." A "degenerate," "elderly" culture needing recasting, rejuvenating. They promoted their own art, architecture, science, and social science, their own youth movements, and a cult of "the new man," enveloping all with an intense interest in style and ritual. Of course, Mussolini and Hitler also recognized the emotional power of art forms – music, marching, rhetoric, painting, graphic design, sculpture, architecture. They found a willing pool of artists who saw their own artistic creativity as being at one with fascist ideology. During the 1920s and 1930s the concatenation of crises listed above produced a severe loss of ultimate meaning. If a country had suffered wars of massive destruction and dislocation, had lost or gained great swaths of territory, saw its own people as refugees (or as displacing refugees), encountered severe recession and class conflict, and was embarked on a fraught political transition, then not merely the "old regime" but also many old ways and beliefs in general seemed inadequate. Social and political ideologies do not require and cannot obtain scientific validation. New ideologies require not truth but plausibility, a seeming ability to "make some sense" of current events at a time when established ideologies are obviously in difficulty. In the interwar period traditional ideologies could not easily interpret contemporary reality, at least across one-half of Europe. Conservatism distrusted the masses who were now on stage, liberalism seemed corrupt and insufficiently statist and nationalist. Socialism distrusted the nation and brought class conflict but not its solution. Christian churches had been in retreat from the secular sphere

and were divided. There was an opening for new ideologies and ideologists, capable of what Lucien Goldman called "maximum possible consciousness," the first to experience the inadequacies of conventional ideologies and the first to generate new ones.

Writers such as Hughes (1967), Sternhell (1976: 320–5), and Mosse (1999) have identified a more general and thoroughly transnational ideological crisis permeating Europe. They see a contradiction between "Enlightenment Reason" and a post-Romantic concern with the emotions, passions, the will, and the unconscious – some borne by "mass" phenomena such as crowds, strikes, war, and nationalism. Some have sought to trace a link through "the history of ideas" between fascism and revolutions of "high modernism" that reflected and reinforced a general crisis of the early twentieth century: "disturbing revolutions" in psychoanalysis, abstract painting, atonal music, the decline of the omniscient narrator of the realist novel, a fascination with the bizarre, the fantastic, the decadent, and the irrational, all subversive to the Enlightenment program of calm, confident reason. But if a transnational crisis of high culture helped cause authoritarianism, it should have caused it everywhere. Can we tone down the argument to a macro-regional one? In this case we would expect the cultural crisis to be greater in the east and south of the continent. Though it was somewhat weaker in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, democratic Paris dominated the avant-garde, while leftist Vienna led its music and psychoanalysis. Nor was the more backward east or southeast into high modernism. In fact, high culture is generated by small coteries of cosmopolitan elites, not much tied to locality. This is especially true of music and art, largely unhindered by linguistic barriers. But it is difficult to connect the "revolutions" introduced by Freud, Schönberg, Picasso, Joyce, and so on to political revolutions. Since many "radical" artists were rejecting art forms embedded in mass human experience (hummable tunes, beautiful landscapes, and so on), they had little connection to the masses. Schorske (1981) says the cultured elites of Vienna saw that liberalism had failed to reform the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were horrified by its emerging violent mass politics. So they retreated into aesthetic romanticism and the occult and rejected the values of the existing social order, foreshadowing the political horrors to come.

But fascists rejected much of this high modernism as "degenerate." So some say fascism was "antimodern." I prefer Gentile's (1996) notion of resacralized modernity, or Herf's (1984) "reactionary modernism," coined to describe the world view of the Nazi engineers he studied. There was nostalgia, romanticism, medievalism, and even primitivism in Nazism. Yet, as Allen (2002) also notes of SS technocrats, Nazi professionals viewed

themselves as modernists. In areas as diverse as engineering, management theory, biology, propaganda, and graphic design, fascists were enthusiastic modernists. They were innovative in mass communication, disseminating their ideology through posters, parades, art shows, movies, and architecture. In architecture and music they were quite conservative; in graphic design, film, and theatrical demonstrations they were radicals. But it does not seem that a crisis of high culture played much role in the power of fascist ideology. Rather, fascists offered plausible general solutions to economic, military, and political crises of the time, which their powers of communication made more resonant.

Indeed, this was the age of rising nation-states, and communication was becoming less transnational, more bounded by states. Eighteenth-century literate communication had been dominated by multilingual churches and aristocratic elites. The Enlightenment had been transnational, diffusing across literate Europeans and beyond. This remained true of its nineteenth-century liberal and socialist heirs, the "enemies" of twentieth-century authoritarianism. Socialist transnationalism was aided by the transnational diffusion of capitalism, the old regimes' habit of punishing dissidents with exile, and the leftward turn of young Jews, pressured by new political anti-Semitism (discussed in my forthcoming book). Cosmopolitan networks of exiles and Jews were the core of the Internationals, easing speedy translation of socialist texts. There were macro-regional subcultures of Marxism, syndicalism, and reformism, but most labor movements felt all these influences. Indeed, authoritarians and especially fascists attacked socialists as cosmopolitan, foreign, treasonous. The late nineteenth-century rise of sociology was implicitly nationalist. Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Mosca barely ever referred to each other. They were insulated behind their own national boundaries, all mounting independent critiques of transnational socialism.

The message of liberalism was also transnational, though it had two main homes, Britain and France. Liberalism embodied parliamentary compromise and open debate between independent gentlemen. It began to encounter difficulties in the age of the masses. The gradual extension of the suffrage in Britain had masked this, since mass parties were gradually incorporated into the gentlemanly ways of Westminster. The Third French Republic also masked it for a time, since Republican parties were united by their common need to defend the Republic against the right. But in the view of conservative notables elsewhere (such as Carl Schmitt), the more sudden entry of the masses brought disciplined parties adhering to preset ideologies. Free parliamentary debate was being swamped by ideological armies. "Liberal"

notables might cling to power by manipulating emerging mass parties, as in *caciquismo* and *trasformismo*, but these became corrupt and developed authoritarian leanings. British ideological influence on the continent declined in the late nineteenth century as Britain became more absorbed in its empire. British, and to a lesser extent French, liberal influence on Europe declined.

Continental debates with liberalism were often challenges to "Anglo-Saxon" (sometimes to Anglo-French) orthodoxy. In philosophy the utilitarianism of Bentham, the positivism of Comte, and American pragmatism – all carrying the pragmatic wing of the Enlightenment tradition – were countered with neo-idealist intentionality, the emotions, vitalism, and *Lebensphilosophie* associated especially with Schopenhauer, Brentano, Bergson, and Nietzsche. Freud's unconscious was paralleled by LeBon's crowd psychology, Sorel's mass strike, and the primordial role of myth. Tönnies and Durkheim challenged the liberalism of Spencer and Comte: Society, they said, was not formed merely by contracts between individuals but required community and collective conscience. Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer developed a sociology of ethnic conflict and militaristic "superstratification" to challenge the more pacific Marxian and liberal theories of class and interest group conflict. These new sociologies remained little known in Britain and the United States. Though Social Darwinism encouraged eugenicism everywhere, the northwest saw the reproduction of the lower classes rather than of "lower races" as the main problem. In Germany and Austria racial Social Darwinism permeated best-selling novels, popular sociology, and new political parties. Though few of these writers were rightists, their vulgarization at "the hands of a thousand minor intellectuals" (says Sternhell) encouraged romantic and populist expressions of nationalism and statism.

France and Germany continued to act as ideological intermediaries to the east and south of the continent. Weber saw the duality of instrumental and value rationality. Ortega y Gasset said Bismarck and Kant personified within Germany the entire European political dilemma: Bismarck offered order, stability, community, and authority, Kant freedom, enlightenment, equality, individualism. Liberals turned from Westminster toward the more embattled, nationalist French Republic. Spanish liberals declared that though England had been the cradle of public liberties, France had universalized them (Marco 1988: 37–42). Germany dominated socialism, from Marx to Bernstein, Kautsky, and Rosa Luxemburg, leaders of the world's biggest socialist party, the SPD. Around 1900, as liberalism faded, French and German socialists and authoritarian conservatives both dominated European political

thought. The new radical right diffused eastward and southward from the two major players of the "frontier zone," the French and the Germans.

French and German concerns differed. French rightists focused on statism, Germans on nationalism. This was because France had settled territories and few ethnic disputes (Alsace-Lorraine was disputed but contained little ethnic tension). The French disputed instead what kind of state would fill this territory. Its turn-of-the-century protofascist intellectuals were spurred by the Republic's defeat of the monarchical, military, and ultramontane right and advanced new forms of statism embracing modernity, "integral nationalism," and mass mobilization. French rightism thus had more appeal in countries with clear boundaries, where the nation was not problematic but the state was. Maurras, Barrès, and Action Française were cited most in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Italy was distinctive in that liberals as well as conservatives gravitated toward such protofascism. But these were liberals who had failed to institutionalize liberal practices in their countries.

In contrast, Germans lacked a single state. They argued about the merits of a Klein (little) and a Gross Deutschland (including Austria and other areas where ethnic Germans lived), whereas the major German states, Prussia/Germany and Austria, shared similar constitutions. So Germans debated ethnicity more than state constitutions. Rightists generated *völkisch* ("folkish," "popular") organic nationalism. This resonated more in areas of Europe where the relationship of ethnicity to state was disputed, across most of the east and in the Balkans. Ethno-nationalism was initially spearheaded by Austrian Germans, since only Austria possessed a European empire embroiled in disputes between "imperial" and "proletarian" nations. Though Social Darwinism diffused right through the continent, the more easterly German lands adapted it to intra-European ethnic differences – the product of anti-Semitism and the disassociation between nation and state found there.

The Great War reduced the geopolitical influence of both countries but increased nationalism. The Romanian Eliade denounced "Transylvanian traitors . . . who believe in democracy and have learned French" (Ioanid 1990: 155). Germanic *volkisch* nationalism spread eastward, especially amid resentment at the war's outcome. Nationalism also drew more generally on the Germanic philosophic stress on "will" and "struggle" by heroes or elites against decadence, corruption, and the banal, popularized by Nietzsche, Wagner, Spengler, and Sombart's distinction between Germanic "heroes" and Anglo-Saxon "traders." Nietzsche and Spengler were popular authors everywhere; Maurras, Barrès, and others were read sporadically in the

northwest. But they resonated far less in the everyday practices of liberal democracies or amid depoliticized Protestantism or Catholicism.

A third German influence was felt through the nineteenth-century dominance of the German university system, and with it the systematization of knowledge more generally (Collins 1998: chap. 13). German universities especially dominated philosophy. But German philology, ethnography, and archeology greatly influenced nationalism. Nationalists formally reject foreign influences, insisting on their own "cosmic singularity." Nationalist visions of *Hispanidad*, Hungarism, "the Aryan *Volk*," "The Third Greek Civilization," and "the Second Rome" claimed to be rooted in a unique national history, civilization, and soil. A Romanian fascist proclaimed, "[O]ur nationalism will accept nothing but the superman and the supernation elected by the grace of God" (Ioanid 1990: 114). Yet nationalism was actually a comparative doctrine in which each nation's genealogy was inserted within a wider civilizational story, influenced by German-dominated scholarship on the Indo-Europeans, Aryans, Orientalism, the Old Testament, the Barbarians, and early Christianity. From the popularization of scholarly writings Romania was proclaimed "the only Orthodox Latin and the only Latin Orthodox" nation. Hungarian nationalists identified three chosen peoples of the world: Germans, Japanese, and Magyars. Magyars, the only "Turanian" people of Occidental culture, could uniquely mediate east and west to found a "third, middle empire." Turks provided an alternative vision of a Turanian Middle Empire. These were world-historical myths influenced by European, especially German, scholarship of the prewar period.

In the interwar period traditional Germanic statism and militarism blended with *volkisch* nationalism and anti-Semitism to produce Nazism. Its influence spread more eastward than southward, where state borders were firmer and racism and anti-Semitism weaker. French statism fused with Italian authoritarian-leaning liberalism and syndicalism to generate Italian fascism. Pareto and Mosca were adapted to suggest that elites pursuing absolute moral values, whatever the means, were superior to the "corrupt" parliamentarism of the "legal Italy." Spann's corporatism drew on Austrian notions of organization by "estates," Manoilescu's Romanian corporatism pioneered peripheral dependency theory. Like Gentile in Italy, their corporatist schemes of social reorganization blended economic efficiency with the integral nation and "the new man." The corporatist one-party trappings of Italian fascism were imitated, from Poland and the Baltic states to Spain and Portugal. Aided by Mussolini's theatrical style and rhetoric, Italy became the center of the new right during the 1920s. As fascism grew it

absorbed more Catholic influence. Mussolini's compromise with the Pope was imitated elsewhere, and Catholic France, Spain, and Portugal adapted Austrian clerico-fascism.

Churches provided key infrastructures of ideological communication. They had been the "soul" of the old regimes and remained powerful mass forces, through school systems providing about half the literate Europeans, and through sermons and pastoral letters reaching every parish, reproduced in newspapers and periodicals. Religious messages flowed through three distinct macro-regions, Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic. But they were also embedded inside each individual state.

Most of the big Protestant denominations were "established" state churches. In the northwest their education systems had been merged into the state or existed in harmonious tandem with the state system. They tended to reinforce the northwestern state, conservative, procapitalist, and prodemocracy, only mildly statist and nationalist. Protestant respect for individual and the local community also generated dissident sects across Scandinavia and Britain that reinforced liberal and social democracy. Northwestern Protestant churches rarely encouraged radical rightism. Germany was different, the only established Protestant church that remained the soul of a semi-authoritarian regime right up until 1918. It was now wary of the secular and Catholic parties of the Weimar Republic, and many churchmen were searching for an alternative state with a sense of the sacred. They found Nazism.

The Eastern Orthodox churches had originally resembled Protestantism in being "established" in their own local states. But most were then subordinated to foreign rulers – Austrians, Russians, or Turks. The monarchs of new nineteenth-century Orthodox states such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece were also drawn from foreign dynasties. Thus the Orthodox churches tended to represent not the soul of the state but the soul of the people – often of the peasantry. Orthodox seminaries and schools helped emerging national liberation movements and organic nationalism. The combination of a mild statism (stemming from their political quietism and their liking for hierarchy) and more pronounced nationalism produced varied political outcomes. Yet important factions in several Orthodox churches bent toward the radical right and even to fascism – especially in Romania (see Chapter 8).

The Catholic Church is transnational except that its base lies within Italy. In some countries its array of teaching orders and schools towered over state schools. Catholic hierarchies had long ago come to terms with the states in which they formed the dominant religion. By the nineteenth century they

provided the soul of the old regimes. But they were then beset by liberals and socialists seeking to secularize the state. The Italian state was secular from the first. By 1900 the church was also losing the battle in France and the Low Countries. Thus some Catholics in the hierarchy and the teaching orders were attracted by "social" and "corporatist" concerns. These parallelled fascism in being ambiguously of both the left and the right (Fogarty 1957; Mayeur 1980). Encouraged by the papal encyclical *Rerum novarum* of 1891, "Social Catholicism" first penetrated economically advanced areas such as Belgium, France, South Germany, and Austria. Catholic labor unions and mass parties were founded. The movement then spread eastward and southward, generating parties such as the German Zentrum, the Austrian Christian Socials, the Italian Populari, and the Spanish Mauristas around the time of World War I. Fascism was to build on the social and hierarchical spirit of "Social Catholicism." But in France and Belgium the social and hierarchical factions split. Social Catholics generated leftist movements, while some of those emphasizing hierarchy went into small fascist movements. Portuguese Integralismo Lusitano absorbed Action Française texts and then transmitted them to Spain in the early 1920s. Catholic mysticism blended with organic nationalism. Maurras's call for a populist nationalism based on order, hierarchy, and community as a defense against individualism, secularization, liberalism, and socialism resonated through Catholicover countries – and also had some influence in Orthodox Greece and the Balkans (Augustinos 1977; Morodo 1985: 92–100, 107–14; Lyttleton 1987: 16–20; Close 1990: 205–11; Gallagher 1990: 157–8).

Thus religious ideological powers were exercised variously. Religion reinforced the macro-regional solidity of the northwestern bloc of countries, favoring a liberal democratic compromise between center-right and center-left. Religion had no single general effect elsewhere. Churches tended to see the godless left as the main enemy, but whom would they support against the left? The nationalism of Orthodox churches might turn conservative or radical. But where old regimes and an attendant church remained strong, churches might move a little rightward yet be wary of fascism (e.g., Spain). But weaker, more vulnerable old regimes had lost some of the sacred aura that Weber called "traditional legitimacy." This loss produced moral panic in which some churchmen began to eye corporatism or even fascism sympathetically – as in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Romania. Amid weakening old regimes, all three religions might be tempted by fascism's moral and transcendent claims not to reject modernism but to resacralize it. Fascism emerged in countries in which churches had played an important though now declining role in political power relations, and fascists exploited this

by managing to transfer some of the sense of the sacred from God to the nation-state.

We are now closer to explaining distinctively fascist outcomes, since these are four out of the five major fascist movements. As others have noted, successful fascist movements tried to modernize and nationalize the sense of the sacred. The religious spirit of Romanian fascism and (to a lesser extent) Austro-fascism was obvious. Italian fascism specialized in its own non-Christian sacred rituals. Gentile (1990, 1996) says it resacralized an Italian state that had been previously desacralized – and the Pope regarded this with sympathy. Nuremberg rallies and the like were also designed to impart the sacred, and many German Protestant churchmen became Nazis. It is going too far to describe fascism as a religion (as Burleigh 2000 and Griffin 2001 do), since fascism saw men alone as bringing progress and rebirth and it had no conception of the divine. But fascism was usually aided by established religions and borrowed many of their techniques, just as it borrowed techniques from socialist movements.

Secular educational institutions were also crucial to the transmission of values. Between 1900 and 1930, university student numbers increased fourfold across the more developed world, a greater rate of expansion than even that of the late 1950s and 1960s. In both periods the surge caused an explosion in student politics. In the 1960s it went to the left; after World War I it went sharply to the right. Table 2.2 shows that expansion was greater in the authoritarian countries. If we remove the two outlier cases, Bulgaria and Denmark, from the calculation, university expansion was 50 to 100 percent greater in the authoritarian than in the liberal countries in the period immediately before the authoritarians came to power there. The difference declined in the late 1920s, since fascists and authoritarians reaching power in Italy and Hungary deliberately reduced the numbers of turbulent students. Expanded student cohorts meant "more raw" young intellectuals experiencing discontinuity between the university and their family backgrounds. We should remember that this expansion was occurring under German university domination. A German *Problemmatik* was being exported at a time of massive economic, military, and political crisis, not a recipe for socializing European youth into pacific liberalism. There was also a generational contribution. New rightist ideologies were also suffused with the moralizing characteristic of youthful idealism. The exploits of D'Annunzio, the first to exploit theatrical publicity and to glorify youth, diffused rapidly among students. Mussolini quickly imitated. Extreme nation-statists promulgated the cult of youth, fascists above all. Since fascism was youthful, it was therefore modern, the society of the future – so fascists persuasively proclaimed to

Table 2.2. *Expansion in University Student Numbers 1900–1930, Authoritarian and Democratic Countries*

	Ratio 1900 = 1.00			Ratio 1920 = 1.00
	1910	1920	1930	1930
Austria	1.63	–	–	0.97
Bulgaria	4.90	19.31	22.45	1.16
Germany	1.58	2.56	2.90	1.13
Hungary	1.33			0.98
Italy	1.03	2.05	1.78	0.87
Japan	1.92	3.20	7.28	2.28
Poland				1.86
Portugal	1.07	2.53	4.78	1.89
Romania				1.98
Spain				1.52
Yugoslavia				1.31
Authoritarian average	**1.92**	**5.93**	**7.84**	**1.45**
Belgium	1.47	1.73	2.01	1.16
Czechoslovakia				1.15
Denmark	2.00	2.64	12.78	4.84
Finland	1.19	1.25	2.57	2.06
France	1.38	1.67	2.63	1.58
Ireland				1.18
Netherlands	1.32	1.81	3.85	2.12
Norway	1.10	1.31	2.48	1.90
Sweden				1.11
Switzerland	1.62	1.65	1.63	0.99
U.K.	1.48	1.93	2.09	1.08
U.S.	1.45	2.52	4.90	1.94
Democratic average	**1.45**	**1.83**	**3.88**	**1.76**

Source: Mitchell 1993, 1995, 1998.

new cohorts of youth. Young men always provided their main bastion of support.

As we see, below, in every country highly educated professionals and high school, university, seminary, and military academy students contributed disproportionately to fascism across the authoritarian half of Europe. In contrast, northwestern fascist movements were more variably composed. Students were prominent in France and Finland but not in Scandinavia or Britain. Military veterans were always overrepresented in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, but northwestern military academies continued turning out younger fascist-leaning men only in France. In the authoritarian half of Europe, most education was state-run and was often a bastion of

conservative statism, while church education produced more varied graduates. In some countries professors were also nationalists.[12] Students were everywhere in the fascist vanguard.

Why did fascism attract the massed lesser intelligentsia? To some extent it reflected the dominance of the German universities and of the German and French military academies in continental education systems. But the power and status of intellectuals who were "notables" in the old regime might also be threatened by the rise of mass movements. The economic explanation would be that highly educated professionals and students became unemployable, receptive to radical politics, and more likely to be rightist since they were middle-class. A more "ideal" explanation would be that intellectuals are entrusted with ideological power in society. It is their job to explore matters of ultimate meaning. If there is a crisis of meaning (produced by the concatenation of contemporary crises), they will experience it most severely and pioneer plausible new answers to the crisis. In fact, highly educated people turning fascist were not those suffering the greatest economic hardship. They seem to have turned to fascism because they were attracted to the message of transcendent nation-statism. Of course, ideology never comes disembodied. These people were inhabiting social milieux in which this message seemed more plausible. Their everyday lives gave resonance to it.

Since most fascists were young males, some have suggested that this was "the generation of 1914," whose first adult experience was of World War I (e.g., Wohl 1979). My case studies reveal that not only the trenches, but also the military academies, universities, and high schools germinated extreme nation-statist and paramilitary values – and among at least two and sometimes three generations of young men. This had started before World War I. Much of the officer corps of Eastern Europe had attended prewar Prussian or Habsburg academies. Metaxas, Codreanu, and Szalasi attested to their importance in forming their ideas. The expansion of reserve systems had brought most young men into contact with militaristic nationalism. World War I cemented this. A cohort of young men left in its wake was armed, uniformed, and committed to paramilitarism as the means of effecting political change. Military academies continued to diffuse military nationalism.

I have tentatively delineated ideological networks communicating authoritarian and fascist ideas. Some were transnational, most derived from the frontier zone states of Germany and France, but they diffused mostly across the center, east, and south of Europe, to be reinterpreted within each national tradition. The core carriers – young educated and military or religious males – developed fascism as an entire meaning system. Their

networks of ideological communication also seem to have added the distinctively youthful fascist blend of moralizing and violence that is usually considered to be its "nonrational" side. However, the center, east, and south was not a monolithic bloc, and I have identified some of the infrastructures, especially religious ones, that contributed different types of authoritarianism across the region. But this is only a beginning to identifying ideological causes. It is hoped that the case studies will reveal more.

CONCLUSION

The interwar surge of nationalism and statism was probably unstoppable. Stronger, more insulated nation-states were emerging everywhere. Yet the surge might have culminated in more moderate forms of nation-statism. The major divide – both conceptually and geographically – was between liberal democracy and forms of rightist authoritarianism. The winners of World War I almost all favored the former. Yet it was not easy to establish liberal democratic nation-states by fiat, as attempted among the losers in 1918. In the center, east, and south of Europe, without the reinforcement of traditions and of the culture of one's entire region, parliamentary democracy seemed fragile and risky. Risk aversion amid an ideological concern with order and security could lead to preemptive repressive strikes. Ceding sovereign powers to the opponent if electorally defeated was routine in the northwest but problematic elsewhere, where "we" increasingly represented morality, civilization, and the organic nation, "they" the threatening "foreign" traitors. Parties were often more committed to substantive value goals than to the rules of the democratic game (Linz 1978). Where a movement believes its ends justifies the means, it will more readily turn to violence.

Conversely, parliamentary sovereignty was routinized across the northwest and so resilient. Here socialists withstood communists, conservatives withstood organic nationalists, all subscribing to an instrumental rationality of means not ends – of swing voters and the middle ground – deriving from their long-term historical implication in the liberal institutions of compromise. The northwest withstood crises until Hitler's armies marched on them. Though buffeted by the Great Depression, by strike waves, and by fluctuating party alliances, it was not in serious danger from its own authoritarian right. The rise of fascism was not here viewed as the dawn of a brave new age but as a distant distasteful threat to civilization. The northwest responded to crisis by moving hesitantly toward the center, to widen the suffrage and deepen welfare states. That bit of the explanation seems obvious. Entrenched relations of political power kept authoritarians at bay, even

in a period of severe economic crisis and some class tension. There is thus no need to proliferate case studies of the entrenched liberal democracies, since they varied so little.

But we cannot yet explain authoritarianism, especially its fascist variant. We have a problem of "overdetermination." The times favored more nation-statism, but all four sources of social power and all four crises of modernity helped to explain the rise of authoritarianism and fascism. Class conflict boosted by late development and capitalist crises fueled authoritarianism and fascism. So did military crisis, through defeat, disruption, and emerging paramilitarism and rearmament. So did the dual semi-authoritarian/semi-liberal state of the center, east, and south of Europe. So did networks of ideological communication, patterned by the regional divide, conveying messages to educated and armed youth that increasingly verged on fascism. We would ideally establish the relative weights of these four broad causes of authoritarianism and fascism by multivariate analysis. But there are only a limited number of countries as cases and only two Europes. On both sides of the divide we have a number of highly intercorrelated possible causes.

Perhaps the five fascist movements all had different causes. After all, Italy went fascist uniquely early, Germany was a revisionist Great Power, Austria was a shriveled country with two different fascist movements, Hungary was shriveled, Romania swollen, both with authoritarians stealing fascist clothes. All might be very different cases. An explanation of fascist regimes would be largely confined to two cases. Comparative analysis cannot cope with such small numbers. I turn instead to the detail of the case-study method, returning to general explanations in my final chapter.